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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The lack of fundamental change within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
seems puzzling given both the policy’s lack of success and the self-initiated 
opportunities the European Union (EU) had to change the policy to address this lack of 
success – namely the major reviews of the policy ending in 2011 and 2015. This study 
seeks to understand this continuity from a perspective that has yet to be taken within the 
scholarship on the ENP – that of learning. The behavioural perspective of 
organizational learning, particularly the concepts of ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ 
learning, is taken as the foundation of the approach. Noting that the description of the 
lack of fundamental change in organizational learning theory has much in common with 
the identity-preservation behaviours described by ontological security, and with the 
objective to connect organizational learning approaches to the study of the EU’s 
external action, a synthesis of organizational learning with ontological security is 
proposed. This synthesis provides organizational learning with a deeper, identity-based 
explanation for why fundamental learning does not occur even when it might be 
expected. Using this framework, and focusing upon DG NEAR (as the ‘organization’ 
most responsible for the ENP) and the reviews (as the clearest opportunities for 
learning), the lack of fundamental learning and, thus, the current state of the policy, can 
be explained as a series of learning opportunities in which fundamental learning was 
expected, but never implemented. This is because fundamental learning would have 
required the EU to change behaviours that can be connected to its identity as a promoter 
of values/norms, thereby constituting a challenge to its ontological security. The 
findings provide insight into the policy’s historical lack of success with an empirically-
based account of the EU’s challenge in changing it, providing more detail to the existing 
literature regarding the continuity of the policy. In doing so, the findings highlight the 
role of identity-preservation concerns as a factor in fundamental learning outcomes with 
respect to the EU’s external action, and therefore contribute to a deeper understanding 
of the EU’s policy learning processes. 
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Introduction 
 
Since its creation, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has become one of the 
primary means by which the European Union (EU) has interacted with the countries on 
its border. As an approach that explicitly combined elements of the enlargement process 
with foreign policy (e.g. Prodi 2002), it has generated a substantial scholarly literature 
(for a recent summary, see Konstanyan 2017). Within this, there has been a sustained 
critique of the policy’s initial (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005) and continued use of 
the enlargement approach without the incentives that accompanied accession (among 
others, see Haukkala 2008, 1617; Lavenex 2017, 65–66; Browning 2018, 108–9). 
Additionally, the incentives that were offered have also been critiqued (Sasse 2008). 
More broadly, the policy itself has (even self-admittedly) not been successful in many 
ways over its lifetime (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 2), and 
in recent scholarly work has started to be declared an outright failure (Lavenex 2017, 
64; see also Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 17). Yet, the policy underwent several review 
processes over the course of its existence thus far (in 2011 and 2015, see European 
Commission and High Representative 2011, 2015c) which, prima facie, would imply at 
least the possibility of change in fundamental ways to address its shortcomings. This 
thesis seeks to investigate this puzzle between the processes of review and the 
underlying continuity (that is, the lack of fundamental change) in the policy.  
 
One strand of research that has attempted to understand the challenges faced by the 
ENP has sought to identify the ways in which the policy is generally structured in an 
ineffective way. As part of this scholarship, two notable critiques of the EU’s approach 
to the ‘neighbourhood’ have emerged: one concerning the lack of country-specific 
sensitivity in the policy’s conceptual approach (Cadier 2014) (not always observed in 
practice (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, esp. 533-534)); another focused upon the 
tension between the competing goals of the policy (e.g. economic/political/stability) 
(see Börzel and van Hüllen 2014; Johansson-Nogués 2007). This latter tension has 
sometimes been described as the difference between the “short-term” and “long-term” 
goals of the ENP (Bremberg 2016, 424; Bosse 2007; more broadly, Pänke 2019, 101). 
While revealing the broader scope of the challenges faced by the ENP and adding 
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important dimensions to the overall critique of the policy, this literature does not 
address the persistence of these problematic elements of the policy over time. 
 
In parallel to this, there have attempts to understand the ENP as part of the EU’s general 
behaviour towards the ‘neighbourhood’. These attempts have utilised a number of 
conceptual approaches to start to account for the persistence of the challenges faced by 
the policy as part of this larger context, but do not account for its own attempts to 
change (via the review processes). One prominent line of this critique can be seen as 
building upon, or responding to, Manners’ (2002) conceptualization of the EU as a 
‘normative power’; these critiques of the ENP have included (among others) accounts 
based on sociological institutionalism (Bicchi 2006), functionalism (Lavenex 2017) 
‘external governance’ (e.g. Lavenex 2004; Bosse 2009), “‘disciplinary governance’” 
(Korosteleva 2016, 376, see also 2018), and critiques of the EU as a normative 
‘hegemon’ (Haukkala 2008), all of which provide a broader account of EU behaviour 
towards the ‘neighbourhood’ that would include the ENP as part of that behaviour.1 
Other assessments have argued that a “lack of coherence in policy implementation” 
(Delcour 2010, 535), and even the nature of EU subjectivity itself in relation to the 
‘neighbourhood’ (Korosteleva 2017), can be seen as a source of the EU’s lack of 
success in the ‘neighbourhood’. By conceptualizing the EU (and the ENP) in these 
ways, scholars have attempted to (at least suggest an) account for its behaviour as part 
of broader context, but these accounts do not provide account for the specificity of the 
ENP review process and its self-created opportunities for change.  
 
Beyond proposing adherence to broader conceptual frameworks from which to analyse 
the policy, there have been a limited number of contributions to the literature that 
address the lack of success of the policy by making reference to the explicit attempts by 
the EU to reform the ENP. One such contribution is Schumacher’s (2015) analysis, 
whose approach in addressing this issue is to argue that the EU seeks to perpetuate some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 These critiques themselves connect to wider literature regarding the EU’s foreign policy. Two of the 
most relevant here would be those that conceptualize the EU as a normative ‘empire’ (e.g. Zielonka 2013; 
Del Sarto 2016; Pänke 2019), and those that regard the EU’s external action as having other, possibly 
internally-focused, purposes (e.g. Rayroux 2013; Mälksoo 2016). While not specifically focused on the 
ENP, these approaches share with this study a focus on the attempt to explain the continuity seen in the 
EU’s foreign interactions. 
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of the narratives that it deploys towards the ‘neighbourhood’ (in this case, the southern 
‘neighbourhood’) in making (or not) changes to the ENP. Similarly, Natorski (2016) 
argues for the fundamental continuity of the ENP after the 2011 review as being a 
consequence of the EU’s desire for ‘coherence’, in particular, “epistemic coherence”, 
resulting from “institutional rules[sic]” (Natorski 2016, 648). These analyses, while 
providing an account of why there was no change from the original policy, understand 
the process from the perspective of the EU alone. They do not account for the feedback 
that the EU received concerning the problems with the ENP. They also only attempt to 
account for (in some cases necessarily so) only one of the formal reviews (the 2011 
review). In a similar way, Johansson-Nogués’ (2018) analysis of the persistence of the 
EU’s security narrative as explaining the persistence of elements of the policy, while 
providing a longer term perspective of the process (including the 2015 review), does so 
from the perspective of the EU’s own narrative. All of these accounts also consider the 
EU to be a unitary actor in some sense, which obscures the collective elements of the 
EU’s functioning – that is, they obscure the understanding of the EU as an organization 
in favour of understanding the EU as an individual (on the relationship between states 
and individuals, see Steele 2008, 15–20). These accounts provide attempts to consider 
the specificity of the ENP’s development and continuity more closely, but they also 
suggest a gap: that the ENP’s evolution should consider not just the role that the EU has 
played, but the role that feedback given to the EU has played, when attempting to fully 
explain the current outcomes.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to begin to address this gap. It seeks to understand more 
clearly the way in which the features of ENP have persisted over time in spite of the 
feedback that the policy was not successful and in spite of opportunities to change. It 
does so by analysing the attempts of the EU to address the lack of success of the ENP 
(namely the review periods) as part of one, long-term process. It proposes to 
conceptualise this process as one of learning, in which the review processes can be 
considered as a sequence of attempts by the EU to address its problems by incorporating 
feedback into its approach. This concept, it will be seen, allows for the natural inclusion 
of feedback into an account of change. This study analyses this concept from an 
organizational perspective to address the lack of this perspective in the literature. As a 
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result, organizational learning is ultimately taken as the foundation of a theoretical 
perspective from which to analyse the ENP. 
 
The main research question for this thesis, then, is: what explains the European Union’s 
lack of fundamental learning with respect to the European Neighbourhood Policy? 
 
In order to answer this question, this study analyses the behaviour of the European 
Commission, as represented by the Directorate-General of European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) by considering the two review 
processes as both in-case observations (within the case of the ENP) of attempts to learn, 
and as interrelated elements of the broader learning process. In order to generate data 
for this analysis, this thesis performs a qualitative content analysis upon the speeches of 
the Commissioner in charge during each review period, and is supported by the EU 
documentation (policy statements, legislation, treaties, etc.) pertaining to the ENP. 
 
Following this introduction, the thesis contains three main chapters. The first chapter 
builds a theoretical framework for studying the ENP on the basis of organizational 
learning in order to address the gaps in the literature noted above. The outcome of this 
chapter is a synthesized framework that provides a set of expectations surrounding the 
behaviour of the EU during the review periods of the ENP. The second chapter provides 
a method for uncovering these expectations within the context of the ENP. In particular, 
it provides a method for examining the in-case observations (the review periods) from a 
historical perspective. The third chapter presents the results of the application of the 
methodology within the framework for each of the two reviews. The reviews are 
presented separately at first, to understand the specific nature of learning for each, and 
then are discussed in combination to establish an account of learning over the course of 
the ENP’s lifetime. Some final conclusions are then presented. 
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Learning and ontological security – a theoretical framework  
 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the concepts of learning and ontological security, and use 
them to build a framework for understanding the continuity in the evolution of the ENP. 
It will begin by reviewing what other scholars have written about policy change and 
learning in the EU, noting that while learning appears in discussions of various EU 
policies, it has generally (with a small number of exceptions) not been developed as a 
way of understanding the external/foreign policy dimensions of EU action, in particular 
the ENP. It will then develop a concept of learning that can be applied to the ENP, 
drawing primarily on the insights of organizational learning theories. As part of this, it 
will present an understanding of the ways in which different types of learning do or do 
not occur. In an effort to connect this approach to understandings of the foreign policy 
the EU, it will review the literature on ontological security and the EU – it will be seen 
that the approaches of organizational learning have a high level of synergy with the 
concept of ontological security when considering explanations for non-learning in 
particular. On this basis, it will present a combined theoretical framework that 
integrates these two concepts in order to provide a more comprehensive explanatory 
model for understanding the types of learning in the context of the ENP to date. 
 
Review of the policy change and learning literature regarding the EU 
 
As this study is concerned with the concept of learning as a means of explaining the 
continued absence of fundamental policy change in the context of a particular case – the 
ENP - this section reviews the literature on policy change and learning as it relates to 
the EU. It will be seen here that, while the literature concerning these concepts is broad, 
and some have been applied to the EU, there has not yet been an attempt to develop a 
theoretical approach that fully accounts for the ENP and its review processes within this 
conceptual field. From the perspective of the research question, theories of policy 
change that relate to the EU generally (particularly from an institutional or 
organizational perspective) can be thought of as one strand of this broader conceptual 
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literature. Within this, two of the most relevant sub-strands for this research concern 
institutionalism and learning. Literature concerning institutionalist approaches is thus 
first discussed, and it is argued here that, while these institutionalist accounts of policy 
change provide some insight into this case, neither organizational perspectives nor 
external feedback are well accounted for in these models. The literature examining 
learning as it relates to policy is therefore then discussed, noting that while a large 
number of theoretical approaches make use of the broad concept of learning, those 
applied to the EU also have yet to do so fully from an organizational perspective. As a 
result, organizational learning is then proposed as the basis for addressing this with 
respect to the ENP. 
 
Theories based around the general approach of institutionalism have produced a number 
of accounts of change within the EU, however the ENP, within the context of this 
study’s focus upon policy change (and non-change), is not well accounted for by these 
existing theoretical approaches. In particular, while these theories have an account that 
includes the idea of an institution/organization, they do not understand that entity as an 
actor in its own right, nor do they fully capture the specific empirical features of the 
ENP and its review processes. The major theoretical branches of institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism, each has an account of behaviour and change (and thus non-change) 
derived from relevant institutional factors (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2000, 3). Rational choice institutionalism, as a theory in which individuals, 
within an institutionally-constrained context (Schmidt 2010, 14), act “entirely 
instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of […][their] preferences” (Hall and 
Taylor 1996, 944–45), is understood to have an implicit concept of reflexivity resulting 
from its ‘instrumental’ approach to action (Bicchi 2006, 288–91). While the ENP 
reviews themselves might be understood as the EU attempting to be reflexive (and thus 
at least engaged in the practice of learning), the general continuity of the policy in 2011 
in particular, when it was clear that ‘preferences’ were not being ‘attained’ (on 
continuity in 2011, see Natorski 2016, esp. 648) would not be well explained by this 
approach. Historical institutionalism, in which the accumulation of institutional ‘sunk 
costs’ – either in material (Fioretos 2011, 373) or social (Aspinwall and Schneider 
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2000, 6–7) terms - influences the range of actions of individuals, has an understanding 
that would help account for general continuity in the ENP over time, but does not easily 
account for the professed willingness of the EU to undergo self-initiated radical change 
(as evidenced by the public consultation questions – in particular the first question 
(European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 4)). 2  Sociological 
institutionalism, in which institutions, and thus the range of actions undertaken by 
individuals, are determined by social norms (the prevailing ‘logic of appropriateness’ – 
(March and Olsen 1998, 951–52; Schmidt 2010, 2)), focuses upon the role of exogenous 
social norms as the source of institutional norms (e.g. Hall and Taylor 1996, 949; cf. 
Fioretos 2011, 374) and is considered not to have a reflexive approach to individual 
behaviour selection (Bicchi 2006, 292). This approach would account for the continuity 
of norms, for instance, within the ENP, but would not account for the advent of the 
review processes as self-initiated (i.e. endogenous) attempts to change the prevailing 
‘logic of appropriateness’. Furthermore, even though each of these theories have been 
applied to the EU (e.g. HI: Immergut and Anderson 2008; SI: Schimmelfennig 2001; 
Bicchi 2006; RCI: Wagner 2003), given their focus on individual action (see Fioretos 
2011, 372–76) they do not give clear accounts of the actions of the organization. As 
such, while each accounts for part (but not all) of the ENP, these institutional 
approaches do not provide a good account for the long-term behaviour of the EU as an 
organization in providing for the continuity of the ENP despite its attempts to change. 
 
Furthermore, while some of the institutional approaches would appear to have an 
inherent concept of policy learning within their models, they do not provide an account 
for this at the level of the organization, nor do they provide a good account of the role of 
feedback. The most relevant example of this is in the case of sociological 
institutionalism, given that it already contains within it an account specifically of self-
change through learning based on its underlying constructivist ontology (for overviews, 
see among others, Fosnot and Perry 1996; Liu and Matthews 2005).3 However, not only 
would this inherent account of learning seem incongruent with its understanding of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Schmidt (2010, 10) argues that historical institutionalism lacks an ‘endogenous’ account of change – 
this would be an example of that criticism. 3 The approach of ‘discursive institutionalism’ would address this absence of ‘endogenous’ change to 
some extent (e.g. Schmidt 2010), however it too is largely focused upon the role of individual action as 
“agents” in this process (Schmidt 2008, 322). 
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relatively static nature of institutions (Schmidt 2010, e.g 5), and its designation as 
“unreflexive” (Bicchi 2006, 292), but this account is, as with other elements of the 
approach, focused upon outcomes for the individual rather the organization (e.g. Fosnot 
and Perry 1996, 27–34). It also does not have a strong, general account of change 
resulting from feedback, unless that feedback would happen to indicate a shift in the 
relevant ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see, for example, March and Olsen 1998, 957–58). 
Thus, even though some institutionalist accounts would appear to have some capacity to 
contain an inherent concept of learning within them, this is not the case. 
 
There is, however, a different set of theoretical approaches to change in general, and 
policy change in particular, that may be useful in more fully capturing the processes and 
outcomes of the ENP reviews; these approaches are based on the concept of learning. If 
the situation of the ENP reviews is considered, it is clear that the review processes are 
deliberately reflective exercises involving feedback, and that the (at least professed) 
goal is policy improvement based on this feedback; that is to say, with the ENP reviews, 
the EU is self-consciously attempting to learn (in particular, see European Commission 
and High Representative 2015b, 4). Within the context of the research question and the 
lacunae in the institutionalist accounts noted above, theories of learning would, prima 
facie, better account for the deliberate, reflective attempts at change found in the review 
processes, while also providing an account of non-change (i.e. a failure to learn). They 
also have an additional benefit for this study – an account of feedback, which has been 
noted as one of the two key ways in which organizations acquire the “external 
knowledge” they need in order to learn about their actions in the world (the other being 
observation of other organizations) (Huysman 2000, 139). As this study is primarily 
concerned with policy (the ENP), the context of its review, and organizations (the EU), 
the policy learning, policy evaluation and organizational learning literatures, as they 
have been applied to the EU, are now examined. 
 
The field of policy learning is complex yet without clear conceptual consensus. There 
have already been a number of approaches to learning developed with a view to 
explaining policy change (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013), and 
there has been acknowledgement that the number of variations of theories in this 
	   15	  
conceptual space is significant (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018, esp. 255-256; Moyson, 
Scholten, and Weible 2017, 162; Goyal and Howlett 2018). This has led scholars to 
attempt to order not only the phenomena of learning (for example, Radaelli 2009), but 
also the theoretical approaches to this phenomena in the literature (Bennett and Howlett 
1992; Zito and Schout 2009; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; 
Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017). Within this, these different ordering schemas 
have been used to create yet more theoretical approaches to studying learning (as 
applied to the EU, see, for example Tamtik 2016; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016), or to 
explicitly attempt to create ‘meta-theory’ (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013). While these 
approaches have yet to construct a shared understanding of the field in general, there is 
at least some agreement regarding major contributions to this broad conceptual 
approach, and some of these approaches have been applied to the EU at various levels 
of analysis. As will be seen, however, not all of these approaches provide an 
explanation at the level of the organization. 
 
Within the literature on policy learning, there are several key contributions 
acknowledged within the field. While these approaches have provided insight into 
different aspect of learning with respect to policy, they have not done so at the level of 
the organization. In this field, the approaches of Hall (1993) and Haas (1992) are often 
considered to be important contributions (Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017, 163; 
Zito and Schout 2009, 1107, 1109–10; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, 599–602). Hall’s 
(1993) approach offers an explanation of learning as a series of ‘orders’ of change 
(“first order”, “second order”, and “third order” learning (Hall 1993, 281–84)) with 
respect to policy, and this approach has been used to help account for policy-making 
decisions with respect to the EU’s relationship with Africa (Farrell 2009). Haas’ (1992) 
approach understands policy change as dependent upon the activities of ‘epistemic 
communities’ which can be sources of feedback (“information and advice” (Haas 1992, 
4)) for a given policy field; this approach has been applied at the level of the Members 
States within the EU to understand policy change (Dunlop 2017). However, even 
though these approaches have some capacity to explain collective action (for example, 
the ‘community’ element of the ‘epistemic community’), they are focused primarily on 
the individual as the level of analysis (Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017, 163) rather 
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than the organization. While there exist analyses that discuss organizational-level 
contexts from the perspective of policy learning (for EU examples, see Scholten 2017; 
Rietig and Perkins 2018), these studies also focus upon concepts developed in these 
earlier works (esp. the work of Hall, see Scholten 2017, 345–46; Rietig and Perkins 
2018, 494; cf. Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017, 170) in doing so they too ultimately 
do not develop an account at the level of the organization. Thus, while they present 
important findings and conceptual frameworks, these approaches have not provided a 
specific account of learning from the perspective of the organization. 
 
There is, additionally, scope for understanding policy learning as related to elements of 
the policy cycle, and thus connecting to the literature that understands the process of 
change from that theoretical perspective; it is first instructive to understand the nature of 
the ENP’s attributes within this context from the perspective of learning. Given the 
review processes and the lack of a specific end date for the policy (the only substantial 
timeframes imposed on the policy are those of the funding cycles (see Article 19 of 
European Union 2014)), the ENP here can be understood from the perspective of the 
classic five-stage policy cycle approach (e.g. Wu et al. 2018). Within this cycle, it is 
proposed here that ‘learning’, as understood above to include feedback, would 
potentially encompass the stages of ‘evaluation’ through to ‘policy formulation’. For the 
ENP, the Commission is the most important actor within this broad process; it is the key 
actor in the ‘evaluation’ (Hahn 2015c; on the Commission and evaluation broadly, see 
van Voorst 2017, 25; Højlund 2014b, 429) and ‘policy formulation’ (as seen in 
European Commission and High Representative 2015c) phases, plays a role in the 
‘agenda setting’ phase (e.g. Article 3(1) of European Union 2014) (and even is 
empowered to oversee the ‘implementation’ phase (e.g. Preamble (26) of European 
Union 2014). This is in contrast to other areas of foreign policy, such as those falling 
under more-classicly CFSP procedures (see Articles 27-31 TEU: European Union 
2016). 4  Given that, within the this institutional framework, the Commission is 
formulating the eventual policy proposal, the ‘decision-making’ aspect of the cycle (in 
which the Council and the European Parliament – in different contexts – are the relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 Its possible that one explanation for this difference might be found in the different levels of engagement 
with the ENP by the Member States (see, for example, Wilson and Popescu 2009, 324; Bicchi 2014, 322). 
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actors for the ENP (e.g. Council of the European Union 2010; European Union 2014)), 
while important, is not necessary as a focal point in this study. Within these stages, 
‘evaluation’, especially within the Commission, would, prima facie, appear to provide 
to the most relevant connection to ‘learning’, and the EU’s approach to ‘evaluation’ has 
specifically been seen as connecting across the entire policy cycle (Smismans 2015, 12, 
18). In connecting to the literature on the policy cycle, then, literature concerning the 
role of ‘evaluation’ provides the clearest potential opportunity to understand policy 
learning.  
 
The literature on policy evaluation, however, has not been fully integrated into the 
existing literature concerning the broader context of organizational-level learning for 
institutions and also does not clearly articulate an organizational-level learning theory. 
In general, this field has been focused upon evaluation procedures as part of the policy 
process, distinguishing evaluation processes at various parts of a policy’s ‘life’ (by, for 
example, differentiating between ex ante and ex post evaluation processes, among 
others (Borrás and Højlund 2015, 99)). Within this, some studies in this field have 
generated insights by examining the EU as a case, and there has been (as might be 
expected) some overlap between this literature and that on learning in general (ex ante: 
Dunlop 2010; ex post: Schoenefeld and Jordan 2019; ex ante and ex post: Højlund 
2014b). However, while there is acknowledgement that ex post evaluations can inform 
policy formation (Smismans 2015, 12, 18), and while there has been some attempt to 
join this field with the broader approach of policy learning (for example Borrás and 
Højlund 2015; Hildén 2011), this general field has remained focused upon the specifics 
of evaluation rather than upon the broader understanding of learning (e.g. Ruddy and 
Hilty 2008; cf. Højlund 2014a; Smismans 2015). Furthermore, that organizational-level 
approaches are covered by this approach is inherent in the policy mechanism under 
discussion (evaluation by an institution of its policies) (see, for example, Højlund 
2014a), rather than as a focus of the theoretical field, and thus are not a specific focus of 
theoretical development. As such, while there is considerable detail in these analyses, 
the overall approach does not yet provide a good fit for accounting for learning 
specifically within the EU as an organization, nor in a situation such as the ENP, where 
the review processes were broader than evaluation alone.  
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There already exists, however, a field of learning studies that focuses primarily upon the 
level of the organization that includes a more general account of this phenomenon – 
organizational learning. This field developed primarily outside of political science and 
its related disciplines (see Easterby-Smith 1997 for an overview), and the general 
concept has since been extended to encompass other types of ‘organizations’ including 
public institutions, governments, and supranational organizations (e.g. Schout 2009 (on 
the EU); Hirschmann 2012 (on the UN)). Unlike theories that focus more upon the level 
of the individual or those that have attempted to account for organizational-level change 
indirectly or as part of the policy cycle, as discussed above, organizational learning 
approaches understand the learning process of individuals as being part of a broader, 
organizational context but also provides an account of the organization itself as learning 
(Argote 2011, 440). They also include within them an understanding of why 
organizations do not learn in the way in which they might be expected to (for example, 
Argyris 1976, 365–66). As will be seen below, this theoretical approach would appear, 
in general, to provide a closer fit for the study of the ENP. However, this approach has 
yet to be fully developed with an analysis of the EU and its external action in mind. 
 
While some of the key parts of the theoretical framework posited by organizational 
learning approaches have been used to analyse the EU, and to some extent foreign 
policy more broadly, they have not been systematically developed to analyse the EU’s 
relationship with the ‘neighbourhood’. Within the literature on organizational learning, 
the work of Argyris and Schön (1978) (see also Argyris 1976, 1999) is considered to 
provide some of the main theoretical foundations for conceptualizing the process of 
learning within organizations (for example, Easterby-Smith et al. 2004, 373). They 
conceptualize the process of learning as operating primarily on two different levels – 
what are termed “single-loop” and “double-loop” learning (Argyris and Schön 1978, 3; 
see also Argyris 1976, 1999). Scholars have built upon this framework to provide 
accounts for many organizations, including within the EU. For example, Dunlop (2010) 
has developed this framework for application to the problem of biofuels policy in the 
UK, noting that it can be used to help understand the role of timeframes in policy 
learning contexts. Likewise, Bossong (2013) uses this in part to provide an account of 
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the development of EU’s CSDP crisis management, while Koch and Lindenthal (2011) 
use it to analyse environmental policy within the Commission. This understanding has 
also been referenced in relation to theories of foreign policy analysis more generally, 
specifically that the understanding that that field has of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ learning 
shares many basic ideas with Argyris and Schön’s approach (Levy 1994, 286, esp. note 
25; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, 599; see also Pomorska 2015, 59).5 However, while this 
distinction between levels of learning exists for foreign policy broadly, the particular 
elements of Argyris and Schön’s approach have not been fully developed as an 
analytical framework for the EU’s foreign policy as it relates to the ENP. Given the 
capacity to include learning and an organizational level of analysis, however, it is 
proposed here that this general approach can form a theoretical foundation that can be 
developed further and usefully be applied to an analysis of the ENP. In the next section, 
the details of the framework proposed by Argyris and Schön will be presented and 
discussed with a view to establishing this foundation in detail. 
 
Learning as an analytical framework 
 
In order to establish a theoretical basis for an analysis of the lack of fundamental 
learning within the ENP, this section will discuss a framework based on organizational 
learning. A definition of ‘learning’ will be established, and the organizational learning 
approach of Argyris and Schön will be presented with a view to understanding the 
behaviour of the EU as an organization with respect to the ENP. Within this framework, 
it will be seen that there is an understanding of how learning occurs and does not occur, 
which is related to the definition of learning that is used. Finally, it will be seen that the 
framework of Argyris and Schön suggests that is possible to combine it with the 
approaches of ontological security to explain the challenges faced by international 
actors (such as the EU) in a more specific manner.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 The term ‘learning’ is used in foreign policy analysis more broadly but, as with the case of policy 
learning, multiple definitions can appear (for example, Harnisch’s (2012, e.g. 48) development of 
“international” learning’). Even in the case of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ learning, the focus can fall upon 
leaders rather than organizations (for example, Ziv 2013). 
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Before proceeding further, it is necessary to establish a definition for ‘learning’. Given 
the range of approaches noted above, it should not be unexpected that the definition of 
the concept itself takes many, sometimes very different, forms, and the field has (long) 
been criticized for the lack of consensus around this fundamental term (Bennett and 
Howlett 1992, esp. 276-278; see also Rietig and Perkins 2018);6 these definitions can to 
some extent be seen as changing depending upon the level of analysis being used. Hall 
(1993, 278), for example, defines ‘social learning’ as “a deliberative attempt to adjust 
the goals and techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information.” 
Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, 486) propose a definition specifically for ‘learning’ in a 
collective context, involving a “collective process” of information gathering which 
results in some type of “collective output”, while also acknowledging that individual 
learning may take place in different forms within this larger picture. More generally, 
Dunlop and Radaelli (2013, 600) define learning in very broad terms as simply “the 
updating of beliefs at its most general level”. It is instructive here to note that Dunlop 
and Radaelli’s definition has something in common with Hall’s, insofar at both 
presuppose learning as involving a change in some fundamental aspect of the entity 
being studied, such as ‘beliefs’ or ‘goals’, and is an approach to defining learning found 
often in the literature (for example, Meseguer 2005, 72; see also the discussion at Zito 
and Schout 2009, 1107–9). In contrast, Argyris and Schön (1978) 7  build their 
framework upon a concept of learning that is based on the idea of ‘error’, and define it 
specifically for organizations. Their definition is: “[o]rganizational learning involves the 
detection and correction of error” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 2; see also Argyris 1976, 
365; cf. Schout 2009, 1125; Bossong 2013, 96).8 ‘Error’, in turn, is understood thus: 
“[e]rror is a mismatch” (Argyris 1976, 365) – Dunlop (2010, 346) clarifies this as being 
“a mismatch between intention and outcome”. While this definition of learning is also 
broad, it is considered here more appropriate for the study of the ENP because it does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 This is also the case for the concept of ‘policy change’ (Howlett and Cashore 2009, esp. 37-41). 7 As mentioned above, the key elements of the framework developed by Argyris and Schön in are 
established in this 1978 text, considered one of the key works in organizational learning (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2004, 373–74; Lipshitz 2000, 456–60). These key elements remained in later work (for example, 
Argyris 1999). As such, the original formulation is followed here, as it is by other scholars (e.g. Dunlop 
2010). 8 Note also Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011, 1124), whose definition would expand this to include new 
knowledge that is not acted upon. As this study is concerned with policy change, this is not considered a 
hindrance, and Argyris and Schön’s more narrow definition is followed here. 
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not already presuppose the nature of learning within its definition, as is the case with 
other definitions of ‘learning’ used by policy learning scholars (cf. the discussion of 
Goyal and Howlett (2018, 7–9) concerning existing definitions). This approach also 
allows for a range of different ‘errors’ to be investigated (as specified below), therefore 
allowing for a more precise understanding of the basis of learning than the (less precise) 
“updating of beliefs” approach of Dunlop and Radaelli (2013, 600), for example, would 
demand. This increased precision, in turn, allows for an approach that can more clearly 
understand the mechanisms of learning (and non-learning) within the ENP. As a result, 
the definition used by Argyris and Schön will be followed here.  
 
In addition to having a distinct definition of ‘learning’, the theory of Argyris and Schön 
contains within its foundations the basis for understanding the actions/behaviours that 
lead to both learning and non-learning. To provide a foundation for their theory of 
organizational learning, Argyris and Schön (1978) develop two concepts of how 
organizations think about how they act in general; they term this a “theory of action” 
(Argyris and Schön 1978, 10–12). The two categories they conceptualize are denoted by 
them as “espoused theory” and “theory-in-use” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 11). To 
summarise these concepts, ‘espoused theory’ is what organizations say they do, and 
‘theory-in-use’ is what organizations actually do (Argyris 1976, 367; see also Argyris 
and Schön 1978, 11; Koch and Lindenthal 2011, 983). While this distinction can appear 
tangential to a discussion on learning, these concepts underpin the descriptions of 
behaviours with which ‘error’ and thus ‘learning’ are ultimately concerned (for 
example, Argyris and Schön 1978, 60–66). As a result, these concepts are used by them 
to more concretely propose an understanding of organizational learning by providing (as 
will be seen below) an account for how organizations both learn and do not learn.  
 
Within their framework for organizational learning, Argyris and Schön understand three 
types of general learning, of which two are particularly relevant to the study of the 
ENP’s review processes here.9 The first type - ‘single loop’ learning – forms the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 The third type (“deutero learning”) is largely concerned with the meta-process of learning; that is, an 
organization learning about its own learning processes (Argyris and Schön 1978, 26–28). While this has 
been expanded upon in the literature (e.g. McClory, Read, and Labib 2017, 1328), it is beyond the scope 
of this study, which is focused upon external interactions (policy outputs). 
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basic type of learning behaviour. ‘Single loop’ learning is initially defined by them in 
terms of the concept of ‘error’ noted above; it is given as: “[w]hen the error detected 
and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its 
present objectives” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 2). This is then combined with the ‘theory 
of action’ ideas (as discussed above) to create a definition of organizational ‘single 
loop’ learning, which they present as occurring when:  
 
members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and 
external environments of the organization by detecting errors which they 
then correct as to maintain the central features of organizational theory-in-
use [sic]. (Argyris and Schön 1978, 18)   
 
Thus, this type of learning might be understood as the process of updating the 
organization’s strategies for achieving its existing goals (Argyris and Schön 1978, 18–
19; Dunlop 2010, 346). For the ENP, this could mean, for example, an attempt to 
engage a broader range of stakeholders to achieve an existing policy goal. This type of 
learning can be considered appropriate if the problem being analysed (in the language of 
Argyris and Schön: the ‘error’ identified as being in need of correction) only requires a 
minor adjustment to bring the actions of the organization better into line with achieving 
its goals (Argyris and Schön 1978, 18; see also Dunlop 2010, 346–50; Argyris 1999, 
68–69). Put another way, this type of learning occurs when nothing about the 
organization’s general behaviour (its ‘theory-in-use’) is challenged by the ‘error’ (Koch 
and Lindenthal 2011, 983). Given that this study is concerned with ‘fundamental’ 
change, it is still possible that smaller changes that do not meet this definition would be 
observed within the ENP; this type of learning would provide an account of these (non-
‘fundamental’) changes having occurred. As a result, this type of learning is relevant for 
use in the eventual model proposed here. 
 
The second type of learning – ‘double loop’ learning – is also based upon the idea of 
correcting an ‘error’; this type of learning can be considered as a way of 
conceptualizing the ‘fundamental’ element of the research question. The primary 
difference between ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ learning is that ‘double loop’ 
learning involves the modification of the underlying behaviour of the organization itself 
– as Argyris and Schön state, this type of “learning occurs when error is detected and 
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corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, 
policies, and objectives” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 3). In terms of the ‘theory of action’ 
foundation for their approach, this implies that the organization’s ‘theory-in-use’ itself 
should change (Argyris and Schön 1978, 21–22). For the ENP, this might 
(hypothetically) mean that, rather than have an overarching framework promoting the 
aquis to all ENP countries, the EU might decide to abandon this and engage only in 
limited, bilateral deals with ENP countries without any reference to European political 
standards.10 The authors make some key observations related to this type of learning: 
one is that many organizations believe themselves to be involved in this type of learning 
most of the time (as they would term it, this is most organizations’ ‘espoused theory’) 
(Argyris and Schön 1978, 139); a second is that, for many organizations, this is not the 
type of learning actually encountered (that is, in most instances, organizations’ ‘theory-
in-use’ results in a ‘single loop’ learning approach)(Argyris 1999, 69); Thus, while 
‘double loop’ learning is fundamentally different from ‘single loop’ learning, both are 
built upon the ideas of correcting various types of ‘errors’. 
 
Given that ‘double loop’ learning, as with ‘single loop’ learning, is built upon the idea 
of correcting an ‘error’, this conceptual framework thus implicitly contains within it not 
only a conceptual division of why certain things are learnt, but also the basis of an 
account for why certain things are not learnt. In a general sense, this can be understood 
simply as the occasions on which ‘errors’ fail to be corrected (or even be detected). For 
‘single loop’ learning, this is the basic failure to address the ‘error’ using existing 
organizational processes and norms (see, for example, Argyris and Schön 1978, 19–20). 
For ‘double loop’ learning, there are two general types of failure: one is failing to adjust 
the organization’s norms to its situation, the second is the failure to correct a ‘theory-in-
use’ that differs from an ‘espoused theory’ (Argyris and Schön 1978, 143, see also 116). 
In a sense, both of these ‘double loop’ learning failures can be considered as aspects of 
the same general failure – the failure to change the underlying, routine behaviour of an 
organization. In a policy context, not learning can be understood at the ‘single loop’ 
learning level as failing to adjust the details of the policy within existing policy goals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 Inspiration for this hypothetical is drawn from the response of (former Director General of DG 
ELARG) Michael Leigh to the 2015 ENP review public submission (Leigh 2015). 
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and norms, and at a ‘double loop’ learning level can be understood as the inability to 
adjust goals/norms in order to achieve the desired outcome (Dunlop 2010, 346, 350; see 
also Koch and Lindenthal 2011, 983–84). For the research question, a lack of 
‘fundamental’ learning would be seen at this second, ‘double loop’ level – that is, the 
failure to adjust organizational norms/goals of ‘the EU’, whether it is because of the 
inability to change their existing norms/behaviour to address the issues of the ENP’s 
performance, or the inability to reconcile the difference between their observed 
behaviour and their claims about their behaviour concerning the ENP. As such, this 
framework includes a clear understanding of both learning and non-learning. 
 
In constructing this framework, the authors provide a set of factors for predicting which 
type of learning will occur, and this set is related to the behavioural norms of the 
organization as they apply to the idea of ‘errors’ preventing ‘double loop’ learning. 
Argyris and Schön (1978, 61–66; 136–39) enumerate a set of ‘governing variables’, 
based upon their ‘theory of action’ (discussed above) for ‘single loop’ and for ‘double 
loop’ learning separately. They argue that the observation of these ‘governing variables’ 
can help predict whether a given learning opportunity will result in ‘single loop’ or 
‘double loop’ learning as the outcome (Argyris and Schön 1978, 61–66; see also 
Dunlop 2010, 350). These ‘governing variables’ are:  
(for ‘single loop’ learning – a type of behaviour they term “Model I”) (all from: Argyris 
and Schön 1978, 62–63):   
• “[d]efine goals and try to achieve them”;   
• “[m]aximize winning and minimize losing”;  
• “[m]inimize generating or expressing negative feelings”; and 
• “[b]e rational”;  
(for ‘double loop’ learning – a type of behaviour they term “Model II”) (all from: 
Argyris and Schön 1978, 137). 
• “[v]alid information”;  
• “[f]ree and informed choice”; and  
• “[i]nternal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of the 
implementations”  
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These ‘governing variables’ are actually behavioural norms (Argyris and Schön 1978, 
61). Argyris and Schön’s ‘models’ of action here thus unify behavioural norms and 
learning outcomes so that, in this framework, when ‘single loop’ rather than ‘double 
loop’ learning (as discussed above) is detected (even if ‘double loop’ learning is 
actually required), one can understand that the behavioural norms observed should be 
those listed here for ‘Model I’ (Argyris and Schön 1978, 64–65). Thus, in specifying the 
conditions under which certain types of learning are predicted to occur, the framework 
also gives an account of how to observe the relevant organizational norms that are 
involved in preventing ‘double loop’ learning. 
 
While the set of factors above is relatively broad, there would appear to be some general 
connection with existing international relations literature. Within these factors, it can be 
seen that, in the case of ‘single loop’ learning, some of the focus (particularly 
concerning ‘feelings’) is on protecting the self from critique and in this way is 
concerned with the continuation of organizational norms or goals (Argyris and Schön 
1978, 64–65; see also Easterby-Smith et al. 2004, 373). To link this to the discussion 
above, this means that organizations that are protecting themselves from critique (thus 
ultimately preserving their norms or goals) would be expected to only exhibit ‘single 
loop’ learning, even if ‘single loop’ learning does not produce a more optimal outcome 
than ‘double loop’ learning (with its accompanying changes to norms/goals) would 
produce. Within theories of understanding policy change in the area of foreign policy, 
there is an existing theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of states not changing 
their behaviour (that is to say, not learning) due to a reluctance to have their 
fundamental understanding of themselves (their identity) challenged, even if this 
continuity produces a “harmful or self-defeating relationship” (Mitzen 2006b, 342) with 
another state - ontological security. There are, then, connections between the framework 
of Argyris and Schön and existing approaches to international relations. 
 
Not only do there appear to be there some connections between organizational learning 
and ontological security regarding non-learning, the two theories would appear to 
complement each other from the perspective of the empirical case examined in this 
study. Of particular interest is the direction from which these two theories approach this 
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shared account of a lack of fundamental change in behaviour – organizational learning 
focuses much of its account on the mechanisms of (non-) learning (i.e. how), whereas 
ontological security (as will be seen below) provides a deep theoretical account of the 
underlying reasons for non-learning (i.e. why). Additionally, these two approaches 
between them also cover all the elements that this study is concerned with – 
organizations, foreign policy, policy change/non-change, and feedback (as part of 
learning). These theories, then would not only have elements in common, but also 
provide explanations that more fully account for the ENP’s development if considered 
together. It is on this basis that ontological security is investigated as a potential 
candidate for theoretical synthesis with organizational security in the next section. 
 
Ontological security and learning 
 
In order to establish the connections between organizational learning and ontological 
security, this section examines the literature on ontological security as applied to the 
EU. In particular, the work of Mitzen is discussed as providing many of the details of 
this approach. The connection between this approach and that of Argyris and Schön is 
then discussed in more detail. Finally, it is argued that, given the similarities, a synthesis 
of organizational learning and ontological security can provide a richer explanatory 
framework for the study of learning by the EU than can be provided by organizational 
learning alone. 
 
Ontological security as a theoretical concept in international relations (and related 
fields) has been developed as a way of linking the understanding that a state has about 
its own identity with an understanding of its behaviour (and its ability to modify its 
behaviour), some strands of which can be understood as relevant to the ideas of policy 
change discussed above. Developed for analysis in foreign policy theories by Mitzen 
(2006b, 2006a), ontological security approaches are acknowledged within the literature 
as having taken different directions of analysis (Kinnvall, Manners, and Mitzen 2018, 
252–53; see also Johansson-Nogués 2018, 3–4; Mitzen 2018, 396–97). If the distinction 
that Mitzen (2018, 396–97) herself makes of the literature, between studies concerned 
with the way states construct their identity and those concerned with the behaviour of 
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states (both of which have been applied to the EU (constructing: Subotić 2016; 
Johansson-Nogués 2018; Mälksoo 2016; see also Della Sala 2018; behaviour: Mitzen 
2006a; Browning 2018), is accepted, this study is situated within this second strand of 
literature concering ontological security.11  
 
Not only is this second strand of literature relevant because of its focus upon behaviour, 
it is also (perhaps even primarily) relevant because it provides a conceptualization of 
state behaviour that is based, in part, on an understanding of learning. In addition, 
included within this is an account of non-learning that occurs in situations where 
learning should be expected. The primary account of the way in which the idea of 
ontological security might be applied to the actions of states is given (as mentioned 
above) by the seminal articles of Mitzen (Mitzen 2006b, 2006a). Her conceptualization 
provides a description and explanation of how a state might be seen to be responding 
predictably to its environment in what otherwise might have been considered an 
irrational way by realist accounts (Mitzen 2006b, 343; Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 
34). A key part of this is the idea of a state engaging in the repetition of certain 
behaviours in situations when adjusting its behaviour would require it to question or 
adjust elements of its own identity (Mitzen 2006b, 346–48) – in other words, 
continuity/non-change in behaviour. Mitzen argues that this continuity of behaviour 
occurs even in situations where the existing behaviour is not resolving (and may even be 
contributing to) negative situations (Mitzen 2006b, esp. 341-343; Steele 2008, 58) – in 
other words, when the environment is indicating that change is, in fact, necessary. 
Importantly for this study, Mitzen regularly describes the process by which a state 
interprets its environment and makes decisions about its behaviour in terms of 
‘learning’, with the description of the conditions under which a state is likely to learn 
about its environment, in a way that allows it to adjust the necessary elements of its 
behaviour, being composed of the ideas of “healthy basic trust” and (in the absence of 
this trust) “rigidity” of action (for example, Mitzen 2006b, 350–51). Mitzen relies upon 
these ideas, developed in the context of individual behaviour, to create a conceptual 
understanding of the state as behaving in the manner of an individual (Mitzen 2006b, 
351–53); that is, she applies an individual explanation to a state (see Steele 2008, 15–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 A recent attempt to combine these two approaches can be seen in Mitzen (2018).  
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20). Together, these ideas allow Mitzen to account for situations when states appear to 
be unwilling to change their behaviour – which is to say, they appear unable to learn - 
even when their environment (or the results of their actions) suggest that they should. 
 
There is considerable conceptual overlap between the conceptualization offered by 
Mitzen and the understanding of certain factors that inhibit ‘double loop’ learning 
offered by Argyris and Schön. In fact, such is the overlap, it extends even to the level of 
language. Like Mitzen, Argyris and Schön posit that ‘trust’ is an element in the way that 
an entity responds to its environment, the lack of which results in ‘rigidity’; for 
example, in discussing the factors that might be observed in ‘single loop’ learning, they 
state:  
 
[t]o the extent that one behaves according to any of the four action 
strategies [of Model I – i.e. ‘single loop’ learning], one will tend to behave 
unilaterally towards others and protectively towards oneself.[…] This tends 
to generate mistrust and rigidity. (Argyris and Schön 1978, 64) 
 
That is, if there is behaviour that the theory would predict results in a ‘single loop’ 
learning outcome, this behaviour will also result in rigid behaviour – behaviour that 
reinforces organizational norms – and therefore an inability to achieve ‘double loop’ 
learning. Mitzen has a similar understand of learning behaviour, only from the 
perspective of the state: 
 
[i]f there are two forms of basic trust then routines, and their effects, should 
vary systematically. Rigid routines should be associated with an inability to 
learn; […] Flexible interstate routines that permit reflection, on the other 
hand, should be associated with learning and transformative change. 
(Mitzen 2006b, 364) 
 
Here, if ‘inability to learn’ is understood in terms of ‘double loop’ learning, then the 
formulations are very similar – two types of underlying behaviour (one flexible, one 
rigid) that produce two types of outcome (learning and non-learning). Similarly, both 
theories are based to some extent on the understanding that rigidity (and mistrust) is 
related to some threat to the entity (state or organization). Writing later, Argyris notes 
that: 
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[o]rganizational defensive routines are any action, policy, or practice that 
prevents organizational participants from experiencing embarrassment or 
threat […]. Organizational defensive routines, like Model I theories-in-use, 
inhibit genuine learning and overprotect the individuals and the 
organization (Argyris 1990). (Argyris 1999, 58) 
 
Mitzen, likewise, notes that “individuals fear uncertainty as an identity threat and 
suppress that fear through routines to which they become attached” (Mitzen 2006b, 
349).12 While Argyris discusses threat in general terms here, Mitzen is more precise 
about what exactly is being threatened – identity; both, however, understand the results 
of dealing with threatening situations to be the same – a lack of ‘double loop’ 
learning/fundamental behavioural change. These points of comparison are, to some 
extent, natural - both conceptual frameworks (as has been discussed) are based around 
the notion that the behaviour of entities changes differently based upon the willingness 
of those entities to change themselves. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable amount 
of overlap between elements of these two approaches to behaviours associated with 
non-learning from two different theoretical perspectives.  
Given that the ontological security approach has a more precise understanding of why 
such threats produce rigid behaviour, combining it with organizational learning would 
provide organizational learning with a more detailed account of why its general 
understanding of threats can also result in specifically rigid behaviour under certain 
conditions. As noted above, only one of the ‘governing variables’ of Argyris and 
Schön’s framework was directly linked to organizational norms through the concern 
about the critique of the self. While this is an clear point of connection between the two 
theories, Argyis and Schön (1978) understand ‘norms’ to be wider than this – a reading 
of their work would suggest that they understand ‘norm’ here as simply any general 
pattern of behaviour, and, in fact, each of the behaviours through which ‘governing 
variables’ might be observed can be considered ‘norms’ (e.g. Argyris and Schön 1978, 
61). Furthermore, as noted above, Argyris and Schön’s approach contains an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 Steele’s (2008, e.g. 13) understanding of the role of ‘shame’ as a motivating factor might be 
considered a ontological security’s parallel version of ‘embarrassment’ here, although it also includes 
within it ‘remorse’, which is not necessarily contained within ‘embarrassment’. As such, while this 
connection to Steele’s understanding is noted, it is not followed here. 
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understanding of what happens when these norms of behaviour are challenged – ‘double 
loop’ learning is avoided, and in its avoidance the norms are preserved. Norms of 
behaviour in general can be thought of as part of an entity’s identity (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 891), particularly in the context of ontological security’s understanding 
of identity (e.g. Mitzen 2006b, 342). As a result, if this general connection is accepted, 
then it is possible to propose that ‘errors’ that require the change of an organization’s 
behaviour/norms, insofar as those behaviours/norms can be understood as part of the 
organization’s identity, will result in ‘single loop’ learning and not ‘double loop’ (i.e. 
‘fundamental’ learning) because of the threat the change required poses to the 
organization’s identity. Given that organizational learning only contains a limited 
account of why the behavioural norms it describes are become ‘rigid’,13 combining it 
with ontological security would provide it with a more detailed explanation underlying 
the predictions that it makes. 
There are some important differences between the two concepts, however, and these can 
be understood as further opportunities for conceptual integration. One of the primary 
understandings of ontological security approaches to state behaviour is the 
understanding that the ‘self’ of the state functions essentially as an individual – that 
those theories that have been developed for individuals can be “scale[d] up” to the level 
of the state (Mitzen 2006b, 343, also 351–53; see also Steele 2008, 17; Browning and 
Joenniemi 2017). Organizational learning, on the other hand, understands the 
organization as distinct from the individual (even though it is composed of individuals) 
(Argyris and Schön 1978, 12–18; see also Argote 2011, 440; Bossong 2013, 96). In this 
way, organizational learning acknowledges the role of the collective in the expression of 
an entities norms/values/goals through its action (e.g. Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, 486). 
Such distinction, however, need not be insurmountable from a theoretical perspective. 
Rather, by acknowledging the account provided by organizational learning theories, 
ontological security can gain access to the predictive elements enabled by the detailed 
understanding of collective processes that exists within the organizations that 
necessarily exist as part of its subject matter – states (on the composition of states, see 
Franke and Roos 2010). That is, the combination of these two approaches would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 Being based on behavioural observation, the account relies largely on the observation of “defensive” 
behaviours among the case studies used to build the theory (for example, Argyris 1999, 178, 188). 
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provide ontological security with an account of non-learning/rigid behaviour not just for 
the state ‘as an individual’, but for the state ‘as a collective’. As such, both theories’ 
explanatory power can be enhanced through their combination into a unified 
framework; in the next section, steps towards such a framework are made. 
 
Conceptual framework synthesis – Ontological security as an explanation 
for organizational (non-) learning. 
 
This final section first discusses the general idea of theory synthesis as an approach to 
political science research. It then proceeds to combine ideas from organizational 
security and organizational learning to provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding the behaviour of the EU, and derives some theoretical expectations for 
this research.  
 
The combination of organizational learning and ontological security into one analytical 
framework fits into the existing practice among political science scholars of both theory 
synthesis generally and learning specifically. In terms of general theoretical synthesis, 
Moravcsik (2003, 132) argues that theories can be combined if they share some 
“overarching assumptions”, even if they do “not share not share a full range of basic 
ontological assumptions”, and that research should be “problem as well as theory-
driven”, with a particular focus upon data. Other scholars would agree in general that 
theories can be combined, although would term this differently (“pragmatism”: 
Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 708; “analytical eclecticism”: Sil and Katzenstein 
2010, 412). Given that this research is explicitly problem-driven and that the two 
theories (as discussed above) overlap in their account of behaviour (specifically, ‘rigid’ 
behaviour/non-learning) that results from a challenge to norms, this research would 
meet Moravcsik’s understanding of a valid context for synthesis. Furthermore, this 
would also be in line with previous work in the field of learning, in which 
organizational learning has been augmented with other theories for greater explanatory 
power when examining the EU (e.g. Dunlop 2010; Koch and Lindenthal 2011). While 
some would dispute the ability of such a synthesis in general (for example, those 
critiqued by Moravcsik 2003, 133–35), the conformity of this synthesis to the criteria 
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above, as well as advantages that each theory gains by its combination with the other in 
this empirical case, are such that Moravcsik’s approach is followed here.  
 
In this case, ontological security can be integrated with organizational learning to 
provide an understanding of the inability to learn though the protection of the self from 
challenges to existing norms/behaviours. Specifically, it is through the elements of the 
organizational learning framework above that account for non-learning at the ‘double 
loop’ level – that is, learning that only results in a ‘single loop’ outcome even when it 
requires a ‘double loop’ approach – that the two theories can by synthesized. Given that, 
as noted earlier, there are two conditions in which ‘double loop’ learning is unlikely – 
the existence of either a difference between ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-in-use’ or a 
challenge to ‘governing variables’ – these conditions can now be modified to 
understand their relationship to identity. Recalling that it was established above that an 
organization’s ‘theory-in-use’ is a set of behaviours/norms which can be understood as 
part of an organization’s identity, for the first condition it can be said that: organizations 
are unlikely to engage in ‘double loop’ learning when their ‘espoused theory’ does not 
match their ‘theory-in-use’ because of the threat that the required changes would have 
to its identity. Similarly, as the ‘governing variables’ are themselves behavioural norms, 
the second condition under which ‘double loop’ learning will not occur can be 
reformulated as: if the behaviours of the ‘Model I’ approach are observed, then ‘single 
loop’ rather than ‘double loop’ learning will be the likely outcome because of the 
inherent threat that change would have upon the identity of the organization. This 
extension allows for the theory of Argyris and Schön to make use of the insights of 
ontological security to provide a richer explanation of situations when entities (such as 
states or supranational organizations) do not appear to correct ‘errors’ in their policy 
programs to the extent that might be expected, or are otherwise engaged in ‘single loop’ 
learning processes rather than ‘double loop’ processes. Thus, the approach of 
ontological security can practically be integrated into the approach of organizational 
learning. 
 
Given this framework, and the discussion of organizational learning and ontological 
security above, some theoretical expectations for the study can be derived, specifically, 
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some expectations for the study of the ENP in the context of the EU learning through its 
review processes. According to the general assumptions and predictions of the theory, 
in general, ‘single-loop’ learning would be the dominant form of learning undertaken by 
the EU and that this should be expected even when the EU claims that it is attempting to 
learn in a ‘double loop’ fashion. If ‘single loop’ learning is observed in the review 
processes of the ENP when ‘double loop’ learning is expected, it should also be the case 
that the explanation is related to the two possibilities given by the theoretical 
framework. That is, one should expect that the reason that ‘double loop’ learning did 
not occur was that either the ‘governing variables’ or ‘theory-in-use’ were seen to be 
challenged. Finally, it should be possible to understand the reason for the particular way 
in which ‘double loop’ learning did not occur as being a function of the EU’s efforts 
(conscious or otherwise) to maintain its ontological security. That is, the behaviour that 
is challenged can be linked to the EU’s identity. These can be considered the basic set 
of theoretical expectations for the ENP based on the integrated theory proposed above. 
 
These expectations can be reformulated as a series of questions to be empirically 
measured. First, what type of learning is observed when looking at the EU’s role in each 
ENP review? Second, if ‘single loop’ learning is detected, should the observation of 
‘double loop’ learning have been expected here (that is, did an ‘error’ require a ‘double 
loop’ approach)? Third, assuming that the result of the previous question indicates that 
‘double loop’ learning should be expected, what explains this lack of ‘double loop’ 
learning – specifically, which of the ‘governing variables’ and/or which differences 
between the ‘espoused’ and actual behaviours/norms that would predict only ‘single 
loop’ learning can be observed as part of the EU’s review of the ENP? Finally, are any 
of the factors identified related to the identity of the EU – that is, can the link be made 
between the behaviour of the EU in these review processes and a potential threat to the 
EU’s identity? Thus the expectations can produce a series of sub-questions for this 
research to answer empirically. A method for establishing the answer to each of these 
sub-questions is presented in the next chapter. 
 
Overall, in this chapter, it was seen that the literature covering the concept of learning 
can be seen as a potentially valuable theoretical approach to understanding the ENP. 
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While other theories exist, and while learning itself is a complex and unsettled 
theoretical field, the conceptual framework of organizational learning emerges as a 
useful theoretical base. Given the conceptual overlap between this approach and that of 
ontological security, a synthesis between ontological security and a classic 
organizational learning approach was proposed, and used to derive some theoretical 
expectations for the study of the ENP from this perspective. In the next chapter, a 
methodological approach to observing these phenomena across the review processes of 
the ENP is presented. 
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Methodological considerations 
 
This chapter presents a method for examining the theoretical expectations presented in 
the previous chapter. It first establishes the precise objects of inquiry and overall 
research design. It then presents an operationalization of the individual elements of the 
analytical framework. 
Methodological overview 
 
In assessing the way in which the EU has or has not learnt over the course of the ENP, 
this research focuses upon the two formal reviews of the ENP that concluded in 2011 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011) and 2015 (European 
Commission and High Representative 2015c). These reviews of the ENP are understood 
here as providing a focused and deliberate attempt by the EU to learn (for example, see 
European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 3). While Argyris and Schön 
posit that organizations adapt to their environment in their general daily practices, they 
also note that processes of “organizational inquiry” are important sites of learning 
(Argyris and Schön 1978, 42); it is argued here that the review processes could be 
understood in this, latter, manner. Additionally, the review processes of the ENP have 
several elements that support their use as comparable in-case observations: they were 
both formal reviews, were both of similar duration,14 and were both overseen by the 
same section of the European Commission (see below). It is suggested here that, with 
these factors in mind, if learning cannot be observed when the EU is self-consciously 
and publicly attempting to learn with respect to the ENP, then it is unlikely to be 
observed more clearly under other conditions, and thus that the reviews provide the best 
opportunity to observe the phenomenon of ‘fundamental’ learning. 
 
In order to study organizational learning within the context of ‘the EU’, the European 
Commission, specifically the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 The 2011 review was conducted from July 2010 until May 2011. The 2015 review was conducted from 
March 2015 until November 2015. 
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Negotiations (herein DG NEAR),15 is taken to be the ‘organization’ through which the 
review processes, as in-case observations (of the case of the ENP), will be examined. 
For the use of the Commission to represent ‘the EU’ with regard to the ENP, as was 
noted in the previous chapter’s discussion regarding the policy cycle, it is the 
Commission that is the most relevant actor with respect to the ENP reviews, in 
particular within the stages of policy ‘evaluation’ and ‘formulation’ – exactly the 
processes that were noted as relevant to ‘learning’, and thus the reviews here.16 For the 
focus upon DG NEAR within the Commission, Koch and Lindenthal (2011, 980) note 
that within the Commission, the DGs can themselves be seen as organizations. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that capacities for processes such as policy evaluation 
vary at the level of the DG (van Voorst 2017), making this level of analysis the most 
relevant for potentially observing learning behaviours. For the ENP, even though the 
policy connects with many other policy fields (for a brief overview, see Helwig, Ivan, 
and Kostanyan 2013, 45–48), and makes use of other resources available in the 
Commission (such as the capacities of EEAS (see, for example, Mogherini and Hahn 
2015)), it is DG NEAR that is the primary actor and, importantly, the DG that carries 
out the reviews and formulates the initial policy proposals (see Lightfoot, Szent-Iványi, 
and Wolczuk 2016, 673). As an organization that fits with Argyris and Schön’s 
understanding of what an organization is (Argyris and Schön 1978, 12–16), and as the 
section of the Commission most directly responsible for conducting the ENP reviews, 
the selection of DG NEAR is here considered an appropriate focus for understanding 
learning within the EU regarding the ENP. The particular features of the ENP, then, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 A note on institutional development. At the time of the second Barroso Commission (beginning in 
2009), the Commissioner for DG ELARG also oversaw the parts of other Commission departments that 
were responsible for ENP matters (European Commission 2009), and was in charge of conducting the 
2011 review. As of the first Junker Commission, DG ELARG became DG NEAR and the various non-
ELARG departments were merged with it to create an officially unified department overseeing both 
enlargement and neighbourhood policy (European Commission 2014). This is not considered a hindrance 
here, as this can conceptually be considered one continuous organization for the purposes of this analysis 
since, with respect to the ENP, there is continuity of an understanding of “making decisions”, “delegating 
[…] authority”, and “setting boundaries”, which would meet Argyris and Schön’s definition (Argyris and 
Schön 1978, 13). ‘DG NEAR’ is used throughout to refer to this entity. 16 For the role of the Commission, it is useful here to compare the main meetings of the 2015 process – 
for the Eastern partners, this was the Riga Summit of the Eastern Partnership in 2015, attended by many 
Member States’ heads of state or government, but also many parts of the Commission (Council of the 
European Union 2015), while for Southern partners, an “Informal Ministerial meeting” was held in 
Barcelona, chaired by the High Representative and Commissioner of DG NEAR, and included only 
foreign ministers in addition to the Commission (European Commission 2015, 1).   
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allow for ‘the EU’ to be reasonably represented by the actions of DG NEAR in this 
instance and therefore DG NEAR forms the ‘organization’ through which the review 
processes are to be observed as potential examples of learning within the EU. 
 
The overall approach here is taken to be an examination of the two in-case observations 
initially, which are then placed in their broader historical context. In doing so, it is 
guided by the general approach of previous studies of learning when accounting for 
historical change. Within the literature concerning learning, it is broadly understood that 
change over time17 is fundamental not just to the conceptual approach (as discussed in 
the previous chapter), but also to the empirical and analytical approach; in particular, 
Hall (1993) has been noted as making this clear – “one of the principal factors affecting 
policy at time-1 is policy at time-0.” (Hall 1993, 277; see also Moyson, Scholten, and 
Weible 2017, 164). More broadly, scholars have taken approaches that incorporate 
some historical approaches within them when studying policy learning, including path 
dependency (Dunlop 2010, esp. 349-350) and “process-oriented analysis” (Koch and 
Lindenthal 2011, 984). While this study is focused primarily upon the two review 
processes as examples of learning, it is understood that the policy being reviewed in 
2015, for example, was itself the result of the 2011 review, and acknowledging this is 
unavoidable. As such, this study is guided by principles of these earlier works while 
also focusing upon the cases as individual examples. 
 
In summary, this study takes the Commission, as embodied by DG NEAR, to be the 
‘organization’ that is used to analyse the actions of ‘the EU’. Within this setup, the 
reviews function as two in-case observations for the case of the ENP that, while related, 
serve as a basis for understanding the attempts by the EU to learn about the ENP over 
time. Using this as a foundation, the next section describes the way in which the 
theoretical expectations of the previous chapter can be measured. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 Also, for example, in the literature regarding ‘institutionalisms’ (e.g. Pierson 2000; Checkel 2006). 
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Operationalization 
 
Within the set of theoretical expectations derived from the literature on learning and 
ontological security in the previous chapter, a number of points of assessment were 
established; it is necessary here to operationalize these for this case. The first 
expectation concerns ‘single loop’ learning, namely: did ‘single loop’ learning occur? 
As noted in the previous chapter, the framework of Argyris and Schön understands the 
phenomenon of ‘single loop’ learning to involve changes to strategies, but not goals. In 
this research, this is to be operationalized as a variable able to take three values 
measuring the changes observed in the policy– ‘change in strategy’, ‘change in goal’, 
‘no change’. ‘Change in strategy’ here is measured by the presence of new strategies in 
the review’s conclusions, and is understood to imply the process of ‘single loop’ 
learning. Similarly, ‘change in goal’ is measured by the presence of new goals in the 
review’s conclusions, and is understood to imply ‘double loop’ learning. If change is 
observed, it must fall into one of these categories. ‘Change in strategy’ can only be valid 
if ‘change in goals’ is not observed, but ‘change in goals’ could also include the 
observation of ‘change in strategies’. ‘No change’ indicates that neither strategies nor 
goals were changed. It is not expected that ‘no change’ would be observed, given the 
context of the empirical case detailed in previous chapters, however it is included here 
for conceptual completeness (following Radaelli 2009, 1147–48). For sources of data, 
the documents detailing the policies of the ENP are here used to establish this change 
through a simple pre- and post-review comparison relative to each of the review 
periods. In this way, values for this variable are generated for both observations. 
 
This approach to measuring learning outcomes is consistent with previous scholarship 
that takes changes in policy to indicate learning (e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992, 285–
88; Hall 1993, 278). It is noted that policy changes do not always necessarily indicate 
learning (Broekema 2016, 383–84), but rather its possibility. However, it has also been 
noted that intentional change based upon a deliberate reflection should be considered as 
an example of learning (Hall 1993, 278). As such, it is here proposed that such 
circumstances exist in the review processes of the ENP by design (e.g. European 
Commission and High Representative 2015b, 3; Council of the European Union 2010, 
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16) and that, as such, changes that result from the review processes under examination 
here can be assumed to be examples of learning (rather than other forms of policy 
change).  
 
Next, it is necessary to establish whether, if ‘single loop’ learning is detected, ‘double 
loop’ learning should have been expected; as discussed in the previous chapter, this 
requires an examination (and thus operationalization) of the two ‘error’ subtypes, 
composed of the ‘theory-in-use’ and ‘espoused theory’ for the first subtype, and 
‘governing variables’ for second subtype, for each review period. For the first subtype 
of this ‘error’ category, it is necessary to compare the ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-in-
use’ elements for each review. To determine the ‘espoused theory’, Argyris and Schön 
are clear – it is simply the way in which the organization declares that it is acting 
(Argyris and Schön 1978, 11). For the EU here, it can be considered as the general way 
in which the EU presents its own behaviour – what it believes itself, and thus claims, to 
be doing – with respect to the ‘neighbourhood’ during the review periods. This can be 
established by examining policy documents, in particular the policies at each of these 
moments, and supported by statements made about the policy by the EU (here 
represented by the Commissioner responsible for the review in each instance). This is in 
line with previous research on the Commission using this framework, which uses 
existing policy documents to understand an organization’s ‘espoused theory’ (e.g. Koch 
and Lindenthal 2011). In this way, the ‘espoused theory’ of each review can be 
established. 
 
For the ‘theory-in-use’, however, more interpretation is required. By definition, an 
organization’s ‘theory-in-use’ must be established based on the observation of the 
organization’s actual behaviour (Argyris 1976, 367). Given that this research is 
interested in the historical behaviour of the EU, it is clearly not possible to establish this 
through direct observation of the organization in its daily routines in the present. As a 
result, it is necessary to rely upon historical evidence of the EU’s behaviour to 
determine this. It is offered here that the documentary evidence of the EU’s behaviour 
over the course of the policy review process (policy documents from the reviews, 
statements by the Commissioner concerning the policy over the course of the review, 
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and relevant legislation) might constitute the primary evidence from which to make this 
interpretation. It is also suggested here that existing scholarly literature that makes use 
of, or interprets, the EU’s behaviour in this policy field can supplement this, by 
affording this study at least indirect access to other relevant, but inaccessible, primary 
evidence (such as contemporaneous interviews, for example). It is then necessary to 
interpret this data and these existing studies to produce a ‘theory-in-use’ of the EU for 
each review period. While this is not the traditional method for determining this element 
of the framework,18 the historical nature of the research conducted here places some 
constraints on the ability to generate better data, particularly concerning the 2011 
review. Given that, as was noted in the previous chapter, the ‘theory-in-use’ is a specific 
form of one of the general types of behaviour (the ‘Model I’ and ‘Model II’ types), then 
the evidence that indicates a general behaviour of the EU can also be understood as 
containing evidence of the specific behaviour of the EU in that moment. As the 
speeches of the relevant Commissioner for each review are analysed by means of 
qualitative content analysis (QCA) for the general case (see below), this information can 
be used to highlight the specific behaviours contained within the speeches for more 
detailed analysis of their relevance to this element of the framework.19 As such, the 
results of the QCA approach discussed below constitutes the selection of passages for 
analysis here to help determine the specific behaviour of the EU in each review, and are 
combined with policy documents and secondary literature to establish the ‘theory-in-
use’. 
 
The second subtype of ‘errors’ involved the establishment of the behavioural norms of 
the EU, understood in the framework as ‘governing variables’. In order to establish the 
‘governing variables’ that exist, it is necessary to operationalize the indicators from the 
framework of Argyris and Schön. These can be considered as categories that constitute 
values for a variable of ‘justification’, which has been noted as one way in which norms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 Within organizational learning studies, more direct observation methods are more common. For 
examples, scholars can make use of interviews (e.g. Dunlop 2010; Koch and Lindenthal 2011), to 
understand this part of the phenomenon. Argyris and Schön’s own research often included direct 
observation and intervention (Argyris 1977, 119–20; see also the discussion of Lipshitz 2000, 463–68), in 
addition to interviews (Argyris and Schön 1978, 178–79).   19 This can be thought of as an adaptation of Argyris and Schön’s use of “content analysis” to attempt to 
derive ‘theories-in-use’ from transcripts and participant activity records (Argyris and Schön 1978, 81).  
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can be detected (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, esp. 892-893; see also Bremberg 2016, 
427–28). The values that this might take are the seven different types of behaviour (i.e. 
the ‘governing variables’) that the framework would expect to observe in learning 
situations, (reproduced here for convenience): 
 
(behaviours that increase the probability of ‘single loop’ learning) (from Argyris and 
Schön 1978, 62–63) 
• “Define goals and try to achieve them”; 
• “Maximize winning and minimize losing”; 
• “Minimize generating or expressing negative feelings”; 
• “Be rational” 
 
(behaviours that increase the probability of ‘double loop’ learning) (from Argyris and 
Schön 1978, 137) 
• “Valid information” 
• “Free and informed choice” 
• “Internal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of the 
implementations” 
 
Here, ‘justification’ might take multiple values from this set – that is, it is theoretically 
possible that several relevant values for this concept might be observed in a given 
situation (Argyris and Schön 1978, 64). Given that this set of reasons is, in part, based 
on the actions of members of the organization (which would normally be observed 
through interviews or direct observation, as noted earlier),20 it is necessary to attempt to 
discern these from their manifestations in the actions and reasoning of the EU 
(following Bremberg 2016, 427–28). As such, it is offered here that the manner in 
which the EU discusses and justifies its behaviour, if done consistently, might provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 If the wider ‘organization’ of the EU is considered, then the involvement of the Member States and the 
‘neighbourhood’ countries in the process is also important to acknowledge. However, the details of the 
debates at Foreign Affairs Council meetings, and the private discussions between the EU and the 
‘neighbours’ are effectively secret, and thus considered here impossible to access. While this data might, 
hypothetically, indicate that the ‘neighbours’ were satisfied with the policy without substantial change, 
this would not necessarily eliminate any difference detected between the ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-
in-use’, for example, and therefore the absence of this data not considered an obstacle in this study. 
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such an insight.  
 
In order to do this, the speeches of the appropriate Commissioner of DG NEAR over the 
period of the review (and soon after its completion) are analysed with a view to 
establishing the way in which the resulting policy is justified. While these speeches are 
largely given during the period of review (rather than entirely after), this is the period in 
which the possible changes to the ENP are most salient in the interactions of DG NEAR 
with the partner countries and the various ENP stakeholders. This selection has the 
additional advantage of providing a similar time span across the two in-case 
observations from which to draw data for analysis. In order to establish which of the 
seven factors that Argyris and Schön detail are present, QCA upon of a set of forty-
three (43) speeches (22 for the 2011 review, 21 for the 2015 review) is conducted. QCA 
is considered appropriate because the study is concerned with how the Commission 
seeks to justify its actions with respect to the categories given in the theoretical 
framework (following Schreier 2012, 40–42). The speeches by the relevant 
Commissioner within this time frame were selected purposively, on the basis of their 
relevance to the issue of the ENP and its review – that is, the speech discusses the ENP 
at some point. All such speeches were included for analysis. Given that this is a finite 
set, saturation criteria were not considered necessary – it is proposed here that the 
speeches selected constitute not a sample, but the entire set of these speeches. Finally, 
the speeches of the Commissioner are here proposed as valid indicators of, at a 
minimum, the EU’s desired interpretation of the review periods by the general public.21  
 
In order to analyse this set of speeches using QCA, the development of a coding frame 
is necessary. Given that the theoretical framework includes within it a set of indicators 
that might be observable, it is possible to use these to produce some initial, 
theoretically-derived codes for the coding frame, however the coding frame also 
provides scope for data-driven codes (e.g. see Saldaña 2013, 7) in order to capture the 
specificity of the reviews. Given this, an initial coding pass of five (5) speeches from 
each of the review periods is conducted in order to capture the details of the behaviours, 
constituting approximately twenty (20) percent of the total content. This frame is then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 Following the discussion at Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 897). 
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checked against two (2) additional speeches from each category for completeness, then 
refined, and applied to the entire set of speeches (following Schreier 2012, esp. 6). As 
the speeches are of differing lengths, and discuss the ENP in different levels of detail, 
the five longest speeches from each review period constitute this initial coding sample, 
on the assumption that these speeches are most likely to contain the greatest number of 
possible emergent codes from which to generate a coding frame. Coding is at the 
paragraph level, although it is understood that, with speeches, this often equates to 
coding at the sentence level in practice. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to establish a link to ontological security. Based on the analysis 
of the variables above, the ‘justification’ can be examined to determine if the 
values/norms that constitute this factor are related to the identity of the EU in some 
way. Using the same data set as the investigation into ‘justification’ allows for these 
values/norms to be extracted within the correct context of discussions about the ENP by 
the EU. It also allows the theory’s synthetic elements to be tested upon the same data. 
Here it is necessary both to extract the values/norms from the ‘justification’ data and 
then to compare these values/norms with those of the EU. For the latter, foundational 
documents of the EU (the treaties, the EUGS, etc.) are the primary sources of data, 
supplemented if necessary with the results of existing studies into elements of the EU’s 
identity (among others, see Johansson-Nogués 2018; Browning 2018). In this way, the 
identity-based elements of the EU’s behaviour can be established. 
 
In summary, this chapter presented the set of methodological choices taken in applying 
the theoretical framework of the previous chapter to the case of the ENP. The 
Commission, through DG NEAR, constitutes the primary focus of this study, and each 
of the theorized points of assessment from the previous chapter appear measurable in 
this case. A number of different documents and techniques are needed, with the primary 
data for analysis being EU policy documents concerning the ENP and speeches by the 
relevant Commissioners of DG NEAR. In the next chapter, the in-case observations of 
the 2011 and 2015 reviews are discussed, and the results from the application of the 
theoretical framework are used to build an evaluation of the research question and the 
applicability of the framework itself.  
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The Reviews of the ENP – 2011 and 2015 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the two reviews of the ENP (concluding in 2011 
and 2015).22  Each review is initially analysed individually through the theoretical 
framework developed in the previous chapters. Following this, a brief discussion of the 
results of the two reviews in an integrated historical context is presented. It will be seen 
that the two in-case observations provide results largely in line with the theoretical 
expectations offered earlier, and that ultimately the results of the analysis support an 
understanding of the ENP’s development as a series of learning opportunities, in which 
‘double loop’ (i.e. fundamental) learning was resisted because addressing the ‘errors’ 
would have involved changing elements of the EU’s behaviour connected to its identity. 
 
The 2011 Review of the ENP 
 
 
The 2011 review of the ENP (European Commission and High Representative 2011) 
occurred within the context of two important changes to the foreign policy environment 
of the EU, within which significant changes to the ENP might have been expected. The 
first change was the recent entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which reorganized the 
foreign policy of the EU both in terms of institutional structure and scope (for example, 
the creation of EEAS)(European Union 2016; Missiroli 2010; as a potential factor, see 
also Natorski 2016, 655). This occurred before the review was announced and, given 
that the scope of foreign policy in particular was modified, it might have been expected 
that the ENP would also change. The second change was within the countries that 
formed the ‘neighbourhood’ – specifically the emergence of what became known as the 
‘Arab Spring’.23 Although this began during the review process, rather than prior to it, 
the significant change in the political situation in those countries involved might also 
have prompted significant changes to the ENP. While both of these contexts are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 A note on sources. For speeches by the Commissioners, where the speech has an official 
‘SPEECH/x/x’ designation through the press release service, page numbers corresponding to the provided 
printable press release are used. Some, however, are published by the EU as webpages only without 
official printable versions (in particular for Johannes Hahn) and are cited as such. 23 One among several terms for this series of events. Its use here follows Bicchi (2014), Noutcheva 
(2015), and Natorski (2016) among many others.  
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explicitly acknowledged by the review (European Commission and High Representative 
2011, 1), as will be seen below, the policy itself did not change in a fundamental way. 
 
The 2011 Review of the ENP as ‘single loop’ learning 
 
 
In applying the theoretical framework, it is first necessary to establish the type of 
learning that the EU ultimately undertook in the 2011 review. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the type of learning is operationalized as ‘change in strategy’, ‘change in 
goals’, or ‘no change’. In order to measure this, the policy as presented by the 
Commission (European Commission and High Representative 2011) was compared 
with the original policy strategy of 2004 (Commission of the European Communities 
2004). There were some obvious differences within the internal structure of the policy 
as a result of historical developments (for example, the creation of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) (Council of the European Union 2009) and Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) (Union for the Mediterranean 2008)). However, as will be seen 
below, overall the policy contains changes that can be understood as ‘changes in 
strategy’, but does not contain changes that can be considered as ‘changes in goals’. As 
such, it can be asserted that ‘single loop’ learning was the type of learning that the EU 
engaged in during the 2011 review. 
 
The 2011 review contains a number of changes that can be considered to be ‘changes in 
strategy’, leading to the conclusion that, at a minimum, ‘single loop’ learning occurred. 
In particular, the key changes within the policy of the ‘more for more’ approach (e.g. 
European Commission and High Representative 2011, 3) and of greater ‘differentiation’ 
(e.g. European Commission and High Representative 2011, 2), are examples of the EU 
adapting its strategy to existing, but not changing, goals. For example, the ‘more for 
more’ approach is explicitly an attempt to better achieve the existing goals – it is 
described as “enhanced support” (European Commission and High Representative 
2011, 3); that is, an enhanced version of the existing support for the existing goals (see 
also Bicchi 2014, 322–23). Likewise, greater ‘differentiation’ contains within it the 
understanding of continuity – an existing approach (differentiation was part of the 
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original 2004 policy (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 8)), within the 
existing goals, simply to a larger extent. As neither of these changes modify the goals of 
the ENP, they can be understood as ‘changes in strategy’. As a result, it can be asserted 
that, at a minimum, the EU engaged in ‘single loop’ learning in the 2011 review. 
 
By contrast, the fundamental continuity of the policy and the general policy goals 
indicate that ‘double loop’ learning did not occur in this instance. Most directly, 
fundamental continuity of the policy itself is evidence that there was no ‘change in 
goals’ with respect to the ‘neighbourhood’ (see Natorski 2016). That is, even though by 
2011 there were other frameworks that existed through which the EU could interact 
with the ‘neighbourhood’ (namely the EaP and UfM as noted above), the EU 
maintained the ENP as the primary policy through which interaction with the 
‘neighbourhood’ occurred.24 Within this, the aims themselves did not change either (see 
Bicchi 2014, 322–23); while the 2011 review highlights a “new approach” (European 
Commission and High Representative 2011, 2), the points listed as constituting that 
approach (“deep democracy”, “inclusive economic development”, and a focus on 
regional approaches (for all, see European Commission and High Representative 2011, 
2)) are all already present in some form within the 2004 strategy (Commission of the 
European Communities 2004, democracy: 10-13; economic development: 6, 9; regional 
elements: 4). This is to some extent acknowledged implicitly in the review itself: with 
respect to “deep democracy”, the real ‘change’ is “greater support” from the EU 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011, 2). As such, this ‘new’ approach 
can only be considered as, at most, a ‘change in strategy’. Given the fundamental 
continuity of the policy itself, and the continuity of the general approach, it cannot be 
concluded that a ‘change in goals’ occurred during the 2011 review and, thus, it is the 
case that ‘double loop’ learning is not observed in this instance. It can therefore be 
claimed that this first variable takes the value ‘change in strategy’ only, and thus that 
only ‘single loop’ learning was observed in 2011.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 The persistence of this approach is line with the goals for the ‘regional’ elements of the original policy 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004, 4). Thus, the emphasis on the EaP and UfM in 2011 
(e.g. European Commission and High Representative 2011, 12–18) would itself be indicative of 
continuity, rather than change.  
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‘Errors’ requiring a ‘double loop’ learning approach in 2011 
 
 
Having established that ‘double loop’ (i.e. ‘fundamental’) learning did not occur in 
2011, it is then necessary within the theoretical framework to determine whether 
‘double loop’ learning was required at all. If ‘double loop’ learning was required there 
should have been circumstances (i.e. ‘errors’) that challenged the underlying behaviour 
of the EU. From the framework, these are understood as manifest either as a difference 
between the ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-in-use’ of the EU, or between the 
behavioural norms of the EU and its environment, each of which is discussed below and 
is measured, as noted in the previous chapter, by examining the speeches the relevant 
Commissioner in combination with supporting documents and the existing scholarly 
literature.  
 
In the 2011 review, the ‘theory-in-use’ of the EU can be understood as being composed 
of the ideas of ‘enlargement’, and ‘more values-based approach’. The first of these, 
‘enlargement’, captures the idea that the EU’s basic approach in the ‘neighbourhood’ is 
based on the enlargement process (such as regulatory alignment and institutional reform 
(see Herdina 2007)) – an idea that has been well documented (e.g. Del Sarto and 
Schumacher 2005, esp. 20, 26-27; Börzel and van Hüllen 2014, esp. 1035-1036). This is 
clearly seen in the continued references to ideas such as “regulatory convergence” (Füle 
2011a, 2, see also 2010c, 2010d, 2010e) and “political reform” (Füle 2010b, 3, 2011a, 
2, see also 2010c, 5). The resulting policy reflects this, as it never challenges the 
underlying goal to drive political and institutional reform (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004, 13). The ‘more values-based approach’ idea here can be understood 
as capturing the behaviour of the EU in bringing more emphasis to the political and 
institutional elements of the ‘enlargement’ idea. This too has been noted in existing 
literature (e.g. Noutcheva 2015, 24; Bicchi 2014, 324; Lightfoot, Szent-Iványi, and 
Wolczuk 2016, 667–70). This idea can be seen in the way values are understood during 
the process of review, for example in the phrases: “[w]e should be more forceful in 
underlining that good governance and political reform are not “optional”[sic] elements 
of our policy” (Füle 2011a, 2) or “the EU has shied away from expressing its 
expectations on shared values. We should be more forceful” (Füle 2010b, 3). This 
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emphasis on the political and institutional aspects of the policy is also seen in the final 
policy produced (e.g. European Commission and High Representative 2011, 2). These 
two ideas, then, can be understood as the way in which the EU acted with respect to the 
‘neighbourhood’ in the 2011 review, and thus as the ‘theory-in-use’. 
 
Similarly, the ‘espoused theory’ of the EU also appears to contain elements of the ‘more 
values-based approach’ to the ENP, in combination with a sense of ‘didactic 
responsibility’ in the actions of the EU towards the ‘neighbours’. Unlike the ‘theory-in-
use’, the ‘espoused theory’ can be derived on the basis of the statements themselves 
without additional interpretation (in line with the discussion in the previous chapter). In 
this instance, the ‘espoused theory’ of the EU in the 2011 review is also concerned with 
emphasizing the role of values (largely through political/institutional reform) in its 
approach to the ‘neighbours’. In addition to those noted above, phrases such as: “[t]he 
European Union encourages reform in our neighbourhood and seeks to promote 
convergence towards our shared values” (Füle 2010c, 7) and “[t]here is also an 
agreement that shared values, including democracy, human rights and rule of law, must 
have a central place in this policy” (Füle 2011b, 2, see also 2011d) can be seen as 
reinforcing this point. This aspect of the EU’s ‘espoused theory’ is given context by 
other statements that position the EU as having a ‘didactic responsibility’ in the 
‘neighbourhood’. The idea that the EU considers itself to have a kind of “duty” to the 
region has been explored previously in studies of the ENP generally (Browning and 
Joenniemi 2008, 532; see also Schumacher 2015, 384–85), and the idea offered here 
echoes that understanding. Here, however, the focus is on the EU’s guidance/experience 
as necessary for the development of the region. This can be seen in references to the 
lessons of 1989 (e.g. Füle 2011c, 2, 2011d, 4), as well as in phrases such as “[t]hese 
programmes will therefore serve as an introduction in the EaP countries” (Füle 2011g, 
3) and “[w]hat happened in May in Tbilisi during the protest rally must never happen 
again” (Füle 2011f, 3). These phrases in particular highlight the EU as having to instruct 
the ‘neighbours’, and is in line with analyses that understand the EU placing itself in the 
role of the “teacher” (Kratochvíl 2009, 8; Dimitrovova 2010, 469). Thus, ‘more values-
based approach’ and ‘didactic responsibility’ can be understood as capturing the way in 
	   49	  
which the EU talks about the ENP, and thus constituting the ‘espoused theory’ of the 
EU in this instance.  
 
Having established the ‘theory-in-use’ and the ‘espoused theory’ in this instance, it can 
be seen that there is not sufficient contradiction between them to consider ‘double loop’ 
(i.e. ‘fundamental’) learning to have been necessary. It is clear from the above 
discussion that there is significant overlap between the ‘espoused theory’ and the 
‘theory-in-use’ in terms of ‘values’. This would indicate that the EU both spoke and 
acted according to the idea that ‘more values-based’ promotion was necessary with the 
‘neighbourhood’. The resulting policy would indicate that this indeed was the case 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011, 2). The other elements, while 
different, do not contradict each other, and might even be considered to be 
complimentary (that is, proceeding in line with ‘enlargement’ practices might be the 
EU’s way of acting out its ‘didactic responsibility’).25 As a result, it cannot be said that 
the EU needed to engage in ‘double loop’ learning on the basis of a difference between 
its ‘espoused theory’ and its ‘theory-in-use’ in 2011. This type of ‘error’ requiring a 
‘double loop’ approach can therefore be eliminated as a possibility. However, it is still 
possible, as per the theoretical framework, that a ‘double loop’ approach was needed on 
the basis of differences between EU’s ‘governing variables’ and its environment. As 
such, it is also necessary to examine the EU’s ‘governing variables’ in relation to its 
behaviour during the 2011 review to determine if ‘double loop’ learning was necessary 
in this instance.  
 
Based on an analysis of the speeches of the Commissioner using the QCA approach 
described in the previous chapter, it is possible to establish the ‘governing variables’ for 
the EU during the 2011 ENP review process. The first major result of the analysis is 
that there were examples of behaviour that would conform to the ‘Model II’ type – that 
is, the EU would appear to have, prima facie, behaved in ways that would be consistent 
with a ‘double loop’ approach to learning. In particular, the behavioural norms 
concerned with the ‘validity’ of information and with ‘monitoring’ were visible. With 
respect to the ‘validity’ of information, this behaviour can be seen in phrases such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25 This would be in accord with the general implications of Browning and Joenniemi (2008, 532). 
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“[w]e have listened to experts and academics” (Füle 2010b, 2); “I have undertaken 
broad-ranging consultations to review this policy” (Füle 2010d, 7); and “[o]ur 
consultations so far have been extensive” (Füle 2011a, 2). Likewise, ‘monitoring’ can 
be seen in phrases such as “[w]e will monitor the progress made towards meeting the 
benchmarks through progress reports” (Füle 2011e, 3) and “[p]olitical influence over 
the judicial system cannot be tolerated anywhere and this is something the European 
Union monitors closely” (Füle 2011f, 3). To some extent, this result should not be 
surprising; given that this was a review process that included within it consultations 
with the ‘neighbours’ and other stakeholders (European Commission and High 
Representative 2011, 1), it should be expected that this context would, at a minimum, 
produce statements that mentioned the ‘validity’ of the input from these stakeholders. In 
fact, statements such as these would be in line with the experience of Argyris and 
Schön, who note that while it is easy to speak of these learning ideals, not all 
organizations actually act upon them (Argyris and Schön 1978, 139). Indeed, the very 
statements of the Commissioner himself would not necessarily support the actual use of 
the result of these consultations in the policy process itself. 26 However, it is still the 
case that while the EU failed to engage in ‘double loop’ learning, it appeared to exhibit 
at least elements of the behavioural model (‘Model II’) that would indicate that it was 
capable of ‘double loop’ learning. As such, this finding would suggest the presence of 
these ‘double loop’-indicating behaviours was not sufficient to enable the EU to engage 
in ‘double loop’ learning.  
 
One part of the reason for this result can be seen in the second major finding of the 
analysis - the dominant presence of behaviours by the EU in 2011 that accord with the 
‘Model I’ (i.e. ‘single loop’-indicating) behavioural type. The analysis of the speeches 
of the Commission reveals that behavioural norm concerned with the definition of goals 
is the most dominant type of behaviour found within the conduct of the EU towards the 
ENP. This behaviour can sometimes seen explicitly in the speeches of the 
Commissioner through statements such as: “[w]e want to discuss the future of ENP 
policy, to define a vision” (Füle 2010c, 10), and “we need to communicate with greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 See, for example, statements such as: “we have taken care to consult widely with our partners so that 
they feel involved in the process” (Füle 2011e, 4) (emphasis added). 
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clarity where we wish the European Neighbourhood Policy, and by extension the 
Eastern Partnership, to lead” (Füle 2011d, 3). Such behaviour can be found in many of 
the speeches by the Commissioner (e.g. Füle 2010a, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e), leading to 
the conclusion that it is a deeply held behavioural norm of the EU in this context. Of the 
remaining categories of behaviour, that concerned with ‘negative feelings’ is the next 
most prevalent, although this can be explained to some extent by the context of the data 
itself; as speeches on foreign policy, often delivered abroad (e.g. Füle 2010a, 2010c, 
2011f), there is some expectation that feelings will be respected as a matter of 
protocol.27 There is also evidence that the EU seeks to engage in maximizing ‘winning’; 
the phrase “[w]e need to avoid overlap and maximize collective impact” (Füle 2011c, 4) 
is an example of such behaviour in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’. As the theoretical 
framework only requires the presence of one of these behaviours for a ‘Model I’ type 
identification (Argyris and Schön 1978, 64), and given the dominance of the behaviour 
concerned with the definition of goals exhibited by the EU here, it can be said that the 
EU’s general behaviour in 2011 was in line with ‘Model I’ type approaches in this 
instance.  
 
Furthermore, in these behaviours, it is possible to identify a difference between the 
behavioural approach of the EU and its environment that would constitute an ‘error’ 
requiring ‘double loop’ learning. Specifically, it is in the behaviour concerned with the 
definition of goals that this difference can be seen. As discussed above, the EU clearly 
seeks to control the definition of the relationship between itself and the ‘neighbours’. 
However, the definition of this relationship was itself a source of problems for the ENP 
insofar as the ‘neighbours’ did not always share, or agree with, the EU in this matter;28 
for example, it is clear from the speeches of the Commissioner that some of the 
‘neighbours’ did not think that value-based and institutional reform were a necessary 
aspect of policy, as seen in statements such as “good governance and political reform 
are not “optional”[sic] elements of our policy” (Füle 2010b, 3, 2011a, 2). This lack of 
common understanding extended to the incentives on offer from the EU, seen, for 
example, in the phrases: “there are some important gaps between partners’ expectations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 Although not in all cases. For example, the speech delivered by the Commissioner at Batumi in July 
2011 (Füle 2011f) might not conform to this expectation at times. 28 See also Natorski (2016, 658). 
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and what the EU may be prepared to offer” (Füle 2011a, 2) and “clear benchmarks in 
which our expectations of partners as regards reform are spelt out more clearly, as are 
the “rewards”[sic] that our partners will obtain if those expectations are met” (Füle 
2011d, 3). Put another way, the EU and the ‘neighbours’ were defining the goals and 
processes of the ENP differently. In terms of the framework, the environment (i.e. the 
‘neighbours’) clearly indicated that the behaviour of the EU here (i.e. in defining the 
goals) was not working. That is, it constituted an ‘error’ that would require a ‘double 
loop’ approach to ‘correct’. That this ‘error’ can be discerned in the speeches of the 
Commissioner is evidence that this was understood by the EU itself. As such, it is 
possible to conclude that there was an ‘error’ that would require ‘double loop’ learning 
in this instance. 
 
From the analysis above, it is also clear that the framework gives a clear mechanism for 
the choice by the EU to not engage in ‘double loop’ learning in this case. Given that the 
EU was engaging in ‘Model I’-type behaviour, the framework would expect that (as 
discussed in previous chapters), when confronted with a problem requiring a ‘double 
loop’ solution, the EU would instead take a ‘single loop’ approach. This can be seen 
here directly, in the advocacy of the ‘more for more’ approach – the Commissioner 
explicitly makes this connection:  
 
This approach - described as “more for more” - implies developing a 
framework with clear benchmarks in which our expectations of partners as 
regards reform are spelt out more clearly, as are the “rewards” that our 
partners will obtain if those expectations are met. (Füle 2011d, 3) 
 
That is, rather than adjust the behaviour of the EU in the definition of goals, it sought to 
attempt to refine its existing behaviour. Thus, not only does the framework allow for the 
source of the ‘error’ to be established, it provides insight into the means by which the 
EU ultimately did not engage in ‘fundamental’ learning in the 2011 review – there was 
a ‘error’ that required the EU to change its own behavioural norms, which were of a 
type that would resist such a change. 
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The link to ontological security in the behaviour of the EU in 2011 
 
Having established the means by which the lack of fundamental (i.e. ‘double loop’) 
learning did not occur in this instance, the reason for this resistance to change can be 
sought. Within the synthetic theoretical framework, this is posited as being an issue of 
ontological security – that is, it is theorized that if that behaviours needing change can 
be linked to parts of the EU’s identity, then the lack of change can be understood as an 
attempt to preserve that identity. It is necessary, therefore, to see if this link can be 
established. 
 
In this instance, it is possible to observe elements of the EU’s identity in its behaviour 
in the 2011 review, in particular the definition of the role of the ENP as being to 
promote values/political reform within the ‘neighbourhood’. It was seen above that the 
EU acted in line with elements of a ‘more values-based approach’ with respect to the 
ENP at this time. It was also noted that the EU sought to control the definition of the 
nature of the ENP, and in doing so it resisted any feedback that would ask it to redefine 
the ENP. These two ideas are necessarily linked – in controlling the definition of the 
ENP, the EU is de facto controlling the definition of what type of emphasis (i.e. ‘more 
values’) the ENP has. These values, as is clear from the speeches of the Commissioner, 
constitute the foundational values of the EU: for example, “[t]he values of good 
governance and rule of law, together with democracy and respect for human rights, lie 
at the heart of ENP. These values underpin all EU norms and standards” (Füle 2010c, 
7). Such a claim by the Commissioner is supported by the treaties themselves, in 
particular Article 2 of the TEU (European Union 2016). In the context of the ENP 
review, the EU can be considered to be protecting its behaviour as a projector of these 
foundational EU values into the ‘neighbourhood’. This behaviour, of value projection, 
is also considered to be part of the EU’s identity; the TEU claims it as such in Article 
21(1):  
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity. (European Union 2016) 
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Scholars have understood the EU’s projection of values in this same way.29 Thus, it is 
possible to understand that the EU’s behaviour, as observed in the 2011 review, was 
identity-related in fundamental ways. 
 
It is also possible to understand that ‘double loop’ learning in 2011 would have required 
the EU to change this behaviour, and thus to change elements of its identity – in this 
way, the link to theories of ontological security can be made. In 2011, the ‘error’ 
discerned was the difference between the EU’s control over the ENP as a means of 
promoting values, and the ‘neighbours’’ understanding of what the ENP should be. In 
order to address this difference, the EU would have been required to give up control 
over the definition of the ENP as a means for value-promotion, and thereby be reduced 
to behaving in a way that no longer included value-promotion. As such, this rejection of 
elements of the policy would have constituted a rejection of elements of the EU’s 
identity. Therefore, the EU’s decision to preserve its control over the definition of the 
policy can be seen as the EU choosing to preserve elements of its own identity. This 
agrees with the understanding of ontological security-related behaviour as discussed in 
the previous chapters – the EU here is preserving (and, as such, repeating) its existing 
behaviour (here, as a promoter of values), rather than change itself to correct an ‘error’ 
in its behaviour revealed by feedback from the environment (here, the ‘neighbours’ and 
their different understanding of the ENP). As a result, it can be said that the EU’s lack 
of ‘double loop’ learning can be understood in terms of the EU’s efforts to preserve 
elements of its own identity rather than have its ontological security challenged. 
 
The 2015 Review of the ENP 
 
 
The 2015 review of the ENP (European Commission and High Representative 2015c) 
also occurred in the context of circumstances that may suggest that significant change 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29 The classic articulation of this is given by Manners (2002). A more recent discussion and summary can 
be found in the work of Birchfield (2013). For the 2011 review period especially, see Del Sarto (2016), 
who would agree with the connection between normative projection and identity. 
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might also be anticipated from its review. Unlike the mid-MFF review of 2011, the 
2015 review was first proposed at the beginning of the new EU governance and budget 
cycle in late 2014 (Junker 2014).30 Additionally, while both policy reviews addressed 
difficulties in the region, unlike the 2011 review (in which the ‘Arab Spring’ occurred 
during the review process), a set of regional issues were already underway prior to 2015 
review being announced.31 Such changes in the Commission and the environment of the 
ENP might suggest that the 2015 review would provide a greater opportunity to observe 
the potential of the EU to undergo fundamental learning (i.e. ‘double loop’ learning) 
(should it be necessary) with respect to the ENP than occurred in 2011.32 However, as 
the theoretical framework (and the empirical case setup) predicted, this was not the 
case. 
 
The 2015 Review of the ENP as ‘single loop’ learning 
 
 
As with the previous review, it is first necessary to establish which type of learning is 
being observed. In this instance, the proposals and declared changes announced in the 
2015 document (European Commission and High Representative 2015c) were 
compared with the policy situation that was established by the 2011 review (European 
Commission and High Representative 2011) in order to determine the value of the 
variable measuring the type of learning (i.e. ‘change in strategy’, ‘change in goals’ or 
‘no change’). While it is possible to observe ‘change in strategy’ in these proposals, as 
with 2011 a ‘change in goals’ cannot be observed in the 2015 policy proposals 
(discussed below), indicating that, while ‘single loop’ learning occurred, ‘double loop’ 
(i.e. ‘fundamental’) learning ultimately did not occur in 2015.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 Although, importantly, after the MFF for 2014-2020 had been adopted (European Union 2013). The 
review was announced on March 4, 2015 (European Commission and High Representative 2015b) and 
concluded with the review report provided by the Commission and HR on November 18, 2015 (European 
Commission and High Representative 2015c). 31 The consultation paper specifically mentions the situations in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and Gaza among 
others (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 2). 32 Given that, as a number of the theories discussed earlier note, large changes of external origin are often 
considered necessary or important for large change (see Scholten 2017, 345–46; Fioretos 2011, esp. 374). 
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For the 2015 review, it can be said that ‘change in strategy’, and thus ‘single loop’ 
learning, can be observed. On one level, the policy details presented in 2015 were either 
a continuation or, at times, a repetition, of those presented in 2011. A key example is 
the changing method of ‘differentiation’. While ‘differentiation’ was highlighted in the 
2015 review as an important element (European Commission and High Representative 
2015c, 2), this was part of the existing policy approach, having also been highlighted as 
part of the 2011 review (European Commission and High Representative 2011, 2). 
What is emphasized in the 2015 review is the extent of the ‘differentiation’ – that is, 
working with the same goal (‘differentiation’), but adjusting the approach (‘more 
differentiation’ (e.g. European Commission and High Representative 2015c, 4)) in 
response to feedback. Likewise, the security elements highlighted by the review (e.g. 
European Commission and High Representative 2015c, 3–4) and later analyses (e.g. 
Koenig 2016, 3, 8; Pänke 2019, 113), such as the extension of existing security 
arrangements to now potentially include CSDP missions (European Commission and 
High Representative 2015c, 14), as with ‘differentiation’ can only be considered a 
‘change in strategy’, given the presence of security-related elements in the previous 
policy (European Commission and High Representative 2011, 5–6). In these examples, 
it is clear that no fundamental shift in policy has occurred. As such, the variable can be 
considered to take the value ‘change in strategy’ at a minimum here, and thus that 
‘single loop’ learning can be observed.  
 
However, the continuation of the general approach of the policy as well as of the policy 
itself indicates that, as in 2011, ‘double loop’ learning cannot be observed here. While 
some of the low-level policy details could conceivable remain constant in the face of a 
fundamental policy shift (for example, moving to a bilateral approach but keeping a 
number of the existing instruments), the continuity of the general policy approach found 
in the 2015 review indicates that ‘double loop’ (i.e. fundamental) learning did not occur 
in this case. The maintenance of the overall unifying policy framework in 2015 (for its 
justification, see European Commission and High Representative 2015c, 4), in 
combination with persistence of the role of the EaP and UfM to do much of the work of 
‘differentiation’ within this framework (European Commission and High Representative 
2011, 13–18, 2015c, 18), represents this continuity at a structural level. The continued 
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use of the underlying ‘more for more’ approach (European Commission and High 
Representative 2011, 3, 2015c, 5) represents this at a financial level. Perhaps most 
importantly, the goals of the policy itself (“stability, security and prosperity” (European 
Commission and High Representative 2015c, 2)) as understood to be the advancement 
of “democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness” (European 
Commission and High Representative 2015c, 2) remain the same (e.g. European 
Commission and High Representative 2011, 21). Given the continuation in all these 
dimensions, it is clear that substantial change did not occur in the policy as a result of 
the 2015 review. As a result it can be said that a ‘change in goals’ was not observable in 
this case, and therefore that ‘double loop’ learning did not occur. Thus, in the 2015 
review, only a ‘change in strategy’, and thus only ‘single loop’ learning, can be 
observed.  
 
‘Errors’ requiring a ‘double loop’ learning approach in 2015 
 
 
With respect to the next stage of analysis, it is still necessary to determine if ‘double 
loop’ learning could have been expected at all by establishing the ‘theory-in-use’, 
‘espoused theory’ and ‘governing variables’ at the time of the 2015 review. While it is 
possible that the ‘theory-in-use’ that existed at the time of the 2011 review continued 
into 2015 by default, this cannot be assumed.33 As this study is focused upon the review 
periods as points of observation, it is necessary to establish the ‘theory-in-use’ for each 
review period and, as such, it is reestablished here. As with the 2011 review, this is 
done on the basis of the speeches of the Commissioner during the period of the review, 
and is supported by additional policy documents and the secondary literature on the 
historical behaviour of the EU with respect to the ENP. 
 
The ‘theory-in-use’ of the EU with respect to the ENP during the period of the 2015 
review can be thought of as consisting of two main elements: what are herein termed 
‘enlargement’ (as in 2011) and ‘unilateral’. The first of these elements, ‘enlargement’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33 For example, Argyris (1999, 84) notes that changes may have occurred by “fiat or unilateral 
imposition”.  
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can be seen as a further continuation of the original approach of the ENP, as 
acknowledged by the Commission (e.g. Hahn 2015h), in which the ENP was in effect a 
copy of the enlargement process that would result in “everything but institutions” (Hahn 
2015h; see also, e.g. Prodi 2002). As noted for the 2011 review, this approach has long 
been noted as a central feature of the ENP (in addition to those cited earlier, see 
Lightfoot, Szent-Iványi, and Wolczuk 2016; Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 22) and this 
approach (and its resulting set of behavioural norms) can be seen as persisting 
throughout the 2015 review process also (cf. Koenig 2016, 8), as part of the EU’s 
‘theory-in-use’. These can be observed in the manner in which the behaviours sought 
from ENP countries are articulated, for example by continuing to seek reforms from the 
ENP countries (among many others, see Hahn 2015d, 2015i, 2016a). It can also been 
observed in the advocacy by the EU for the continuation of the use of instruments that 
were, and remain, designed to work with the enlargement process in mind (such as 
TAIEX and Twinning (Hahn 2016b)). Perhaps most clearly, it can be observed in the 
persistence of the underlying goals of the original enlargement-based ENP (seen in the 
repeated insistence that the EU was not “giving up on […][its] values” (Hahn 2015c, 2, 
see also 2015b, 2015j)). While there were attempts by the EU to rhetorically position 
itself as open to criticism of this underlying logic (for example, with the 
acknowledgement that some may have found the approach “patronising” (Hahn 2015c, 
2, 2015b, 2, see also 2015h)), it is also the case that no actual self-critique of this 
approach is offered, nor were any proposals that would fundamentally contradict this 
approach suggested by DG NEAR (European Commission and High Representative 
2015c).34 This is further underscored by the persistence of the ENI funding apparatus, 
which, in Title 1, Article 2, Section 2(b), maintained as a goal “legislative 
approximation and regulatory convergence towards Union and other relevant 
international standards” (European Union 2014).35 From this evidence, it is clear that 
‘enlargement’ (without membership) remained part of the underlying approach of the 
EU to the ENP during the 2015 review process and constituted part of its ‘theory-in-
use’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34 On this point, Koenig (2016), among others, would disagree and argue that differentiation itself would 
constitute a change from this approach. 35 This instrument has also been used to highlight the continuation of conditionality (Koenig 2016, 10; 
Bremberg 2016, 434). 
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The other element of the EU’s underlying approach to the ENP at the time of the 2015 
review, ‘unilateral’, can also be detected in the policy documents, statements and 
secondary literature regarding the ENP. ‘Unilateral’ can be seen as the behaviour of the 
EU in which it does not consider the ENP countries’ wishes or preferences in the design 
or implementation of the policy. As with the ‘enlargement’ element, the EU’s 
behaviour, through the ENP, has been characterized as ‘unilateral’ with respect to the 
‘neighbourhood’ within the scholarly literature (e.g. Haukkala 2008, 1612–13; 
Nicolaidis et al. 2014, 737–38; Theuns 2017, 295). As above, it is asserted here that this 
behaviour can be seen in the actions of the EU at the time of the 2015 review, and that 
this can be seen in the speeches of the Commissioner during this period, in particular 
through the definition of the policy’s elements prior to their negotiation with the ENP 
countries. For example, the description of differentiation as “[t]hose who want to seek 
deeper integration will continue to do so. Others who want a more transactional 
partnership will get a narrower menu” (Hahn 2015h) – here it is still the EU that decides 
the ‘menu’, even when the goal is to engage with the ENP countries more 
cooperatively. Or again: 
When you read the review you will find a new emphasis on stabilising our 
neighbourhood […] this means a greater focus on security issues […] [i]t 
also means using economic development […][b]ut let me stress again: the 
EU's own stability is based on democracy and rule of law. That is the kind 
of stability we mean. (Hahn 2015j, 2) 
Here, the EU itself defines what stability means, and thus subsequent negotiations can 
only constitute a discussion of how the EU’s definition applies. More broadly, and 
perhaps most clearly, the idea of ‘unilateral’ can be seen in the process of the review 
itself. The announcement of the review contained within it a series of focus points for 
the review (e.g. Hahn 2015b), which helped shape the public consultation questions 
(European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 6–9), and which ultimately 
shaped the final review (European Commission and High Representative 2015c, 2–3) – 
that is, the outcome of the review itself (having been declared to be interested in public 
consultation (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 10)) was already 
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framed by the Commission at the time of its announcement.36 ‘Unilateral’ then, can be 
considered another part of the EU’s ‘theory-in-use’ at the time of the 2015 review. In 
combination with the ‘enlargement’ element, it constitutes the EU’s ‘theory-in-use’. 
 
Having established elements of the ‘theory-in-use’, it is next necessary to establish the 
‘espoused theory’ of the EU over the same period in order to conduct the comparison. It 
is possible to assert that (one element of) the EU’s ‘espoused theory’ here can be 
thought of as one of ‘differentiated cooperation’. The first concept, ‘differentiated’, here 
represents the idea that the EU understands itself to have already been acting in a 
differentiated manner toward the ‘neighbourhood’. This is clearly articulated in the 
announcement of the 2015 review: “the concept of differentiation has been present from 
the start” (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 4). The EU here 
presents itself as acting (in fact, as always having acted) in accordance with the concept 
of ‘differentiation’. This idea is reinforced by the way in which the document describes 
the partners’ role in this process: for example, by attributing ineffectiveness of the ENP 
to “the changing aspirations of our partners” (European Commission and High 
Representative 2015b, 2). Here, it is the partners’ seeking of even more difference that 
is the issue, not the efforts of the EU. Even though large parts of the discussion of the 
review ultimately involved discussions of ‘differentiation’, it is often found in the 
context of, for example, “more differentiation” (Hahn 2015j, 2, see also 2015h, 2015c) 
– that is, an expansion of what the EU is doing already. Such statements by the EU 
concerning how the EU thinks about, and talks about, its approach to the 
‘neighbourhood’ thus support the inclusion of ‘differentiated’ into an understanding of 
its ‘espoused theory’. 
 
The second element of the ‘espoused theory’ is that of ‘cooperation’. This is based on 
the idea that the EU works in partnership with the ‘neighbours’ and, as with the idea of 
‘differentiated’, be seen in the announcement of the review and its supporting 
discussions. When discussing the ‘neighbours’, they are referred to often as the 
“partners” (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, e.g. 2; see also 
Hahn 2015j, 2015f, 2015e, 2015c). When presenting the way in which the ENP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36 This was not lost on some respondents to the public consultation (for example, Leigh 2015, esp. 2-3). 
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operates, terms such as “partnership” (Hahn 2015b, 2) and “cooperation” (Mogherini 
and Hahn 2015, 1) are used. Even the very process of the review itself is presented at 
times as a chance to “consult partners on their interests and ambitions for this 
partnership” (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 3). While the 
2015 review acknowledges that the partners themselves may not always have the same 
understanding of this relationship to the ENP as the EU (e.g. “lack of a sense of shared 
ownership” (European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 4)), it is also clear 
that the EU believes that this is, in part, simply due to ineffectively communicating the 
benefits of the ENP (e.g. European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 9; see 
also Hahn 2015d), thus reinforcing its presentation of itself as already engaged in joint 
and cooperative relationships with the ‘neighbours’. As such, the second element of the 
‘espoused theory’ of the EU at the time of the 2015 review can be understood as 
‘cooperation’.  
 
Even in the case that there is a clear difference between the ‘theory-in-use’ and the 
‘espoused theory’ of the EU, it is still necessary to establish the ‘governing variables’ of 
the EU; if these norms can be identified as being in conflict with the organization’s 
goals, then the theory would identify this as an ‘error’ that required ‘double loop’ 
learning. Perhaps more importantly, if those norms can be identified as belonging to the 
‘Model I’ approach of behaviour (i.e. those that would predict ‘single loop’ learning), 
then the mechanism for preventing ‘double loop’ learning will also be clear. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the speeches of the Commissioner were examined 
using a QCA approach in order to determine the ‘governing variables’ present in this 
review. 
 
As with the 2011 review, one of the findings of the analysis of the 2015 review is the 
presence of behavioural norms that in line with ‘Model II’ type of organizational 
learning behaviour. Again, a number of the EU’s behaviours indicated the seeking of 
“[v]alid information” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 137). While this was the only one of the 
‘Model II’-type behaviours to be observed in 2015 (unlike in 2011), it was done so with 
some frequency (see particularly the use of the term ‘honest’ when discussing the 
review/consultation process (i.e. Hahn 2015h, 2015g, 2015a)). This may be related to 
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the existence in 2015 of the public consultation (European Commission and High 
Representative 2015b) – in these circumstances, any public consultation would 
reasonably be expected to present itself as seeking ‘valid’ and ‘honest’ feedback (in the 
manner of European Commission and High Representative 2015b, 10). In 2015, the 
feedback from these consultations is cited as part of the justification for the particular 
policy changes presented (for example European Commission and High Representative 
2015c, 4, 5, 7, see also 2015a). However, much like the 2011 review, the actions of the 
EU – here the explicit framing of the outcomes of the review prior to it occurring (as 
discussed above), in combination with the structure of the review questions within that 
framing (see, for example, the comments of Leigh 2015, esp. 2-3) – would suggest that 
the public consultation itself was not actually central to the final policy that was 
produced. It is still noteworthy, however, that ‘double loop’-indicating behaviours are 
present, in contrast to the ‘single loop’ learning outcome established above. As with 
2011, it indicates that the presence of these behaviours was insufficient to produce a 
‘double loop’ learning outcome. 
 
An initial explanation of the ‘single loop’ outcome in 2015 can be found, as in 2011, in 
the finding that almost all of behavioural norms that would predict ‘single loop’ 
learning can be identified in the behaviour of the EU in 2015, the most dominant of 
which, again, concerned the definition of goals. It is clear from the discussion above 
regarding the 2015 ‘theory-in-use’ norm of ‘unilateral’ that there was a clear indication 
in the data that the ‘Model I’ behavioural norm of “[d]efine goals and try to achieve 
them” (Argyris and Schön 1978, 62–63) could be found. Additional examples of the EU 
either directly setting the goals, or setting the terms by which they are defined, can be 
seen in the phrases: “I want a focus on stabilization. […] [t]his means prioritising 
economic development” (Hahn 2015h) and “[i]t is essential that reforms advance and 
the EU, with the new ENP, will be more flexible to accompany Tunisia” (Hahn 2015g). 
That this behavioural norm was identifiable to such an extent is the strongest indicator 
that the approach of the EU in 2015 was dominated by a ‘Model I’ (i.e. ‘single loop’-
indicating) approach.  
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While the other behavioural norms predicted by the theory did not appear to quite the 
same extent in all cases, they did still appear, and reinforce the determination that the 
EU here was engaged in a ‘Model I’ behavioural approach. Of the three other categories 
of the ‘Model I’ type, that which is concerned with ‘feelings’, was the least visible of 
the behaviours on the surface. However, much like the 2011 example, the context of the 
speeches themselves can serve as some indication of this category. That is, the data is 
taken from public speeches by the Commissioner and, therefore, these speeches would 
be expected to be, at a minimum, diplomatically polite. Thus, the very format itself can 
again be seen as an indication of the presence of the ‘feelings’ behavioural category. 
The category concerning ‘winning’/‘losing’ was also less visible than the category 
regarding goals, although examples were more common than those concerning 
‘feelings’. An example can be seen in the following:  
 
So we have achieved a lot. We have brought some neighbours closer. But 
in the light of structural problems and turmoil in many parts of the 
neighbourhood, we have to take a hard look at the policy and ask self-
critically: is it working? Is it delivering? How can we do better? Because 
we have to do better, in our own interest! (Hahn 2015h)   
 
This passage contains the idea of achieving a goal within it, but key to the passage is the 
idea of being ‘better’, that is, of ‘maximizing’ outcomes, within the bounds of the 
existing policy. As such, this category of behaviour can also be said to exist in the EU’s 
approach to the ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, while the final category concerning 
‘rationality’ is also not as dominant as the category concerning goals, it too appears with 
regularity; the most common formulation of this behavioural norm found in the data 
was the idea that the policy was being reviewed to better address the interests of both 
the EU and the ‘neighbours’. For example, the statement: “Federica and I will reach out 
to all parties to discuss how the design and implementation of the ENP can be better 
adapted to our interests and theirs” (Hahn 2015c, 1) is typical of this category’s 
manifestation. While none of these additional categories is strictly necessary to claim 
that the EU behaved in a ‘Model I’ manner towards the ENP in the review process,37 
the fact that all categories can be observed here reinforces the conclusion that the EU 
was acting in a ‘Model I’ (i.e. ‘single loop’-predicting) manner in this review. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 Since, as Argyris and Schön (1978, 64) note, behaviour of any of those four categories will influence 
behaviour towards ‘single loop’ outcomes.  
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Having established the behaviour of the EU in 2015, it can be seen that both types of 
‘error’ that would require a ‘double loop’ learning response are observable; from the 
discussion of the ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-in-use’, it is clear that these two 
constitute a clear difference (i.e. a ‘mismatch’ constituting an ‘error’) in this instance. 
Where the ‘espoused theory’ can be seen as having ‘differentiation’ as an element, the 
‘enlargement’ element of the ‘theory-in-use’ would be in conflict with this idea. 
Similarly, the ‘unilateral’ element of the ‘theory-in-use’ would be in conflict with the 
‘cooperation’ element of the ‘espoused theory’. It is also clear that this potential for 
continued difference was known to the EU – the announcement of the public 
consultation notes that: “[s]ome partners are actively seeking closer integration with the 
EU. Others are not, or not currently, attracted by it, calling into question some of the 
assumptions on which the ENP has been constructed” (European Commission and High 
Representative 2015b, 4). This difference between the ‘theory-in-use’ and the ‘espoused 
theory’ thus constitutes one of the ‘error’ types requiring ‘double loop’ learning to 
resolve. Moreover, it could also be argued that the ‘governing variables’ themselves 
contain a difference (or ‘mismatch’) with the environment, also constituting an ‘error’ 
requiring ‘double loop’ learning. In particular, as in 2011, the behaviour concerned with 
defining goals can be seen as challenged by the recognition by the EU (noted above) 
that the ENP countries themselves would prefer to define the goals jointly. It is 
therefore another example (with 2011) of a difference between a behavioural norm of 
the EU and the requirements of the environment, and thus would also constitute an 
‘error’ requiring ‘double loop’ learning to resolve. It can be concluded therefore, that 
both ‘error’ types that would require a ‘double loop’ response are visible in this case. 
While the theory does not require that both exist, in this instance it might be the case 
that this reinforced the need for ‘double loop’ learning here. 
 
It is also possible to conclude from the above discussion the mechanism by which 
‘double loop’ learning did not eventuate from a behavioural perspective. From the 
discussion of the ‘governing variables’, it is clear that EU’s behaviour conformed to the 
‘Model I’ type. Given that the theory understands that behaving according to this type 
should result in ‘single loop’ outcomes even when ‘double loop’ outcomes are 
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necessary, it can be concluded in this case that the EU’s behavioural norms in general 
could predict that the required ‘double loop’ learning would not occur. The final stage 
of the analysis for the 2015 review, then, is to ascertain if a deeper cause can be 
discerned in any links between these behaviours and the EU’s identity. 
 
The link to ontological security in the behaviour of the EU in 2015 
 
 
If the ‘theory-in-use’ of the EU here is examined, it can be seen that it contains clear 
elements of the EU’s identity. Specifically, if the ‘enlargement’ element is considered, 
then there are clearly articulated components of this approach that are visibly linked to 
foundational elements of the EU’s self-understanding. In articulating the approach of 
the EU in this way, the idea of a need to continue to promote ‘values’ recurs.38 As was 
seen above, the EU understands its aims to be defined (or redefined) in terms of ‘values’ 
(for example, the idea of “stability” being equivalent to “democracy” and the “rule of 
law” (Hahn 2015j, 2)). Yet the connection is even more clearly made with respect to the 
ENP generally, for example: “[t]he promotion of democracy, human rights and rule of 
law is a defining characteristic of the EU” (Hahn 2015c, 2). This should not be 
surprising given the treaties, in particular Article 21(1) of the TEU (European Union 
2016) (and given the discussion of the 2011 review). The ENP, therefore, in being 
expressed in terms of promoting these values, can be understood as an expression of the 
ideas and values underpinning the EU itself. That these continue (i.e. post-2011 review) 
to be part of the identity of the EU can be seen in analyses of the EUGS (European 
Commission 2016) that note the role of values in this document (Johansson-Nogués 
2018, esp. 9-10; Mälksoo 2016, 7–8).39 From this it is clear that of the EU’s ‘theory-in-
use’ here can be related to an understanding of the EU’s identity. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of ‘double loop’ learning, it is this element of the EU’s 
identity that would require change in order to address the observed ‘error’, thereby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38  As with 2011, Manners’ work serves as a starting point in general (Manners 2002, esp. 241).  See also 
the discussion of the 2011 review above. 39 The role of values can be also seen in the literature characterizing the EU as a normative ‘empire’ (e.g. 
Zielonka 2013)	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connecting organizational learning with ontological security. Part of the ‘error’ 
observed in the 2015 review was the difference between the EU’s ‘enlargement’ 
‘theory-in-use’ and its ‘espoused theory’ of ‘differentiation’. It is clear from the above 
quotes that the EU understands that some ‘neighbours’ would prefer a situation in 
which values play less of a role at times – meaning that, for the EU to bring its 
behaviour in line with its ‘espoused theory’ (thereby ‘correcting’ the ‘error’), it would 
have to forgo elements of its ‘enlargement’ approach associated with value-promotion. 
Through the lens of ‘double loop’ learning, the EU’s identity as a promoter of values 
would require change, and thus the idea of no longer acting to promote values would 
constitute a threat to that element of the EU’s identity. From this perspective, 
ontological security theory would provide a reason for this change to be resisted – that 
the EU chose not to engage in ‘double loop’ learning in order to preserve these elements 
of its identity. It can be said, therefore, that in the 2015 review, the EU’s lack of ‘double 
loop’ (i.e. ‘fundamental’) learning can be connected to its ontological security concerns.  
 
2011 and 2015 – Explaining the current state of the ENP as learning and 
identity 
 
 
In light of the findings of the individual reviews, it is possible to understand the ENP’s 
development as a series of learning opportunities over time, with the current state of the 
policy understood as the result of the learning approaches taken. In 2011, the 
behavioural norms of the EU were challenged by feedback from the environment, when 
the EU’s insistence on control over defining the elements of the ENP was not accepted 
by the ‘neighbours’. In 2015, there was both a difference between the ‘espoused theory’ 
of the EU and its ‘theory-in-use’ (where the ‘unilateral’ and ‘enlargement’ elements of 
the ‘theory-in-use’ contradicted the ‘differentiated cooperation’ that was ‘espoused’) as 
well as a conflict between its behavioural norms and the environment (again, the 
insistence on controlling the definition of the elements of the ENP). In both cases, it 
was established that ‘single loop’ learning occurred when ‘double loop’ learning should 
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have been expected.40 While the framework understands these outcomes to be different 
from a theoretical perspective (in that the difference noted between the ‘theory-in-use’ 
and ‘espoused theory’ constitutes a different type of ‘error’ than the difference between 
the behavioural norms and the environment), it should be noted that the substance of the 
‘errors’ in 2015 is related to that identified in 2011. Specifically, the EU’s underlying 
behavioural norm of defining the goals of the approach of the ENP, whether in openly 
controlling the process (as in 2011) or simply acting in that manner (as in 2015), can be 
seen as clearly connected to the lack of ‘double loop’ learning in both instances.41 The 
persistence of this underlying issue – the control exerted over the definition of the 
elements of the ENP – although manifesting in different forms, suggests that the current 
policy is best understood from this wider, historical perspective. This would be in line 
with general understandings about the importance of time in explaining outcomes (e.g. 
Pierson 2004); however the synthetic framework used in this study would not imply 
that, for example, the outcome of 2015 was more likely because of the outcome of 2011 
(as would be the case in studies focused upon the role of path dependence, for example 
(on path dependency, see Pierson 2000, 489–96)). In this sense, the approach taken here 
uses time to explain the current state, without using it as a distinct variable; that is, the 
decision to only take a ‘single loop’ approach in 2011 led to the policy that itself was 
not fundamentally modified in 2015, but did not determine the outcome of the 2015 
review. As such, the current state of the policy can be understood as the outcome of a 
series of connected, although distinct, learning events.    
 
Furthermore, the contemporary state of the policy can be seen as the product of a series 
of identity-based challenges having been resolved in favour of maintaining the status 
quo in each instance rather than engaging in fundamental behavioural (and thus 
identity) change. In each instance, it was seen that the underlying reason for the 
rejection of a ‘double loop’ approach could be linked to the preservation of elements of 
the EU’s identity. That the two instances of this challenge were related – concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40 This result thus confirms and reinforces the basis of the initial ‘puzzle’ – that the EU could have been 
expected to behave differently in both instances, given the conditions in which it found itself. 41 In a sense, this might also be understood as the underlying issue from 2011 being at least known as an 
issue in 2015, with the resulting behaviour seen as a failure to address the underlying problem with this 
new awareness in mind. This would position the 2015 outcomes as not so different as the initial data 
might suggest, but rather as a more complex version of the original issue seen in 2011. 
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with the role of values in the policy – should not be a surprise within the context of the 
historical process here; if elements of the identity of the EU (as distinct from their 
manifestation in behaviour) were preserved as a result of the decision to not undergo 
‘double loop’ learning in 2011, it should not be unexpected that these same elements of 
identity were identifiable in the decision not to undergo ‘double loop’ learning in 
2015.42 As such, it is possible to understand the contemporary state of the policy as a 
series of attempts by the EU to avoid engaging in fundamental change due to attempts 
to preserve its identity. This continued repetition of identity-preservation in the face of 
external information indicating that change is necessary would fit with Mitzen’s (2006b, 
350–51) characterization of ontological security-seeking behaviour. Thus, it is possible 
to understand the combination of the two reviews as being not just two separate 
occasions on which the identity-related behaviours of the EU preserved, but a case 
where the same identity-related behaviour is repeatedly preserved, despite expectations 
that it should change to address its environment. In this way, the contemporary state of 
the policy can be seen not only as a series of learning events, but also as a series of 
identity-preserving events in which repetition of the same behaviour can be observed. 
 
With these results in mind, it is possible to present the findings as an answer to the 
research question. The question for this research was: what explains the European 
Union’s lack of fundamental learning with respect to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy? From the above results, it can be said that: fundamental learning did not occur 
within the context of the ENP, even though it should have been expected, because the 
‘errors’ the EU encountered required the EU to change itself to address them, and it 
chose not to change itself in order to preserve elements of its own identity. In short, the 
lack of fundamental learning here can be understood as the result of the EU choosing 
‘single loop’ approaches to ‘double loop’ problems in order to preserve its own identity. 
When viewed from the context of the current policy, it can further be understood that 
the current policy can be seen as series of occasions in which these ‘errors’ requiring a 
change to the EU itself were encountered, but that the identity-preserving course of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42 Although this relationship is visible in this case, the theoretical framework does not require that this is 
constant over time. Furthermore, while this is not a surprise (given that the reviews were attempting to 
address the same policy), there is no reason within the framework to assume it should be expected in 
general.  
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action was taken. It is therefore possible to understand the current policy as a function 
of organizational learning behaviours within the EU (‘errors’, behavioural norms, etc.), 
the outcome of which is underpinned by concerns of ontological security on the part of 
the EU. In the next (final) chapter, conclusions based on these findings are presented, 
and implications for ENP scholarship and future research are noted.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, the case of the ENP was examined from the perspective of a synthesis of 
organizational learning and ontological security in order to answer the question: what 
explains the European Union’s lack of fundamental learning with respect to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy? It was established that this synthetic theoretical 
approach provided a theoretical perspective that differs from existing approaches to 
studying the ENP (e.g. Schumacher 2015; Natorski 2016; Johansson-Nogués 2018) in 
that it allowed for the incorporation of feedback while also incorporating a level-of-
analysis that focused upon the organization. This theoretical approach resulted in a 
framework that understands resistance to ‘double loop’ (i.e. ‘fundamental’) learning as 
connected to an underlying challenge to the identity of the learner (in this case, the EU). 
In order to explain the continuity of the ENP, the theoretical framework was then 
applied to the ‘organziation’ of DG NEAR, utilising data from the two review periods 
of the ENP (2011 and 2015) as in-case observations of the ENP – these being instances 
of the most likely points of observation of learning within the policy’s lifetime. This 
data, comprising speeches by the relevant Commissioners of DG NEAR and 
supplemented with policies, treaties and other documents, allowed for the behavioural 
norms of the EU, as embodied by DG NEAR here, to be extracted and analysed within 
the broader synthetic theoretical framework. 
 
The analysis of the data, both as individual reviews and then together in their historical 
context, demonstrated that, not only can the current ENP be understood as the outcome 
of a series of learning events that threated the EU’s identity, but also that the synthetic 
theoretical framework itself provides an internally-consistent result. At each time 
period, the EU was observed as being aware of an issue that required ‘double loop’ (i.e. 
‘fundamental’) learning, yet chose to engage only in ‘single loop’ learning. In addition, 
at each time period, this choice can be connected to the EU’s identity, with the EU 
acting to preserve the current approach at each time rather than change aspects of its 
own identity. Specifically, while the exact behavioural manifestation of identity-
preservation differed for each in-case observation, in both observations it was seen that 
the identity of the EU as a promoter of values was challenged. As a result, it can be said 
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that this study provides an explanation for the lack of fundamental learning with respect 
to the ENP at each time period and, when these observations are placed together, also 
provides an explanation for the fundamental continuity seen in the current policy. That 
is: fundamental learning did not occur within the context of the ENP, even though it 
should have been expected, because the ‘errors’ the EU encountered required the EU to 
change itself to address them, and it chose not to change itself in order to preserve 
elements of its own identity. It can also be said that the framework used here produced a 
result that is internally coherent within the context of theoretical synthesis. As such, it 
validates the synthetic theoretical framework used in this study as a means to 
understand the lack of fundamental learning in a policy context. 
 
The findings should, however, be read in light of the limitations of the present study. 
First, as noted earlier, the traditional method of examining behaviour through the lens of 
organizational learning theories is by means of contemporaneous interviews. As the 
ENP reviews represent historical examples, this was not possible. While the 
methodological approach taken here produced sufficient data to conduct an analysis, 
had it been possible to have access to more in-depth contemporaneous data concerning 
the learning processes, the findings here could have been further substantiated by the 
additional detail that such data can provide. Second, as a single case study with in-case 
observations, the conclusions drawn here are also necessarily limited, in this case to the 
context of the EU’s foreign policy as enacted through the Commission. However, the 
underlying theoretical models used (organizational learning and ontological security) 
are more general in their applicability, suggesting that there is scope for future testing of 
this approach, at a minimum, in other areas of the EU’s policy portfolio that are linked 
to the EU’s external action. Finally, from the perspective of theory-testing, this case 
provides a clear instance of identity-based challenges being related to a lack of 
fundamental learning however, as a single case study, this result may not hold for all 
institutions or supranational settings. Further testing of the applicability of the 
framework to examples of supranational entities other than the EU in future studies 
would be a welcome contribution to establishing the scope of these findings. 
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Nevertheless, the findings can be seen as connecting to the existing literature on the 
ENP, while potentially providing a different perspective to contemporary 
understandings of the 2015 review in particular. First, the finding that identity-
preserving behaviours play a role in the EU’s policy learning efforts adds more nuance 
to the critiques of the lack of substantial change in the ENP (e.g. Lavenex 2017), by 
providing more insight into the specific causes of this outcome (in the manner of Börzel 
and Lebanidze 2017; Lightfoot, Szent-Iványi, and Wolczuk 2016), and in doing so 
demonstrates the value of examining the ENP from the perspective of learning (thereby 
including feedback). Second, by highlighting the role of ‘values’ as an underlying 
element of the ENP, and the connection these have to the EU’s identity, these findings 
would appear to support those strands of the ENP literature that emphasise the 
normative aspects of the EU’s behaviour in the ‘neighbourhood’ (e.g. Del Sarto 2016; 
Zielonka 2013; Pänke 2019); in particular, the repetitive identity-preserving, and thus, 
value promotion-preserving, choices seen in the data would suggest that ‘values’ do 
play a key role for the EU’s behaviour in the ENP (contra Bosse 2007; cf. also 
Johansson-Nogués 2007, 191–92). Third, the in-case findings engage with discussions 
on the type of change seen at each review period; specifically, the findings here would 
indicate that the 2015 review did not represent a significant change for the policy, and 
that the EU’s identity was relatively stable with respect to the policy over these periods 
(insofar as the EU’s behaviour with respect to the ENP might be considered an example 
of the ‘routinized’ behaviour that Mitzen (2006b, 350–51) describes); this would be in 
contrast to some contemporary research into the EU’s identity that understands the 2015 
review (as a precursor to the EUGS) to constitute a more noteworthy change (e.g. 
Johansson-Nogués 2018, esp. 11; Korosteleva 2018, 11). This suggests that more fine-
grained analysis of the 2015 review and the EUGS is necessary to understand the 
relationship between the changes therein and their connection to different elements of 
the EU’s identity. In these ways, the findings contribute to the existing literature 
regarding the ENP. 
 
Furthermore, the findings contribute to understandings of EU foreign policy and policy 
change more broadly. That ontological security theories can be usefully applied to the 
case of the ENP gives more support to studies that take this approach when analysing 
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the EU generally (e.g. Johansson-Nogués 2018; Mitzen 2018). In particular, this study 
suggests that ontological security approaches could provide useful analytical lenses 
when considering the lack of fundamental change in other areas of the EU’s policy 
portfolio, especially those areas that connect to the EU’s external action. More broadly, 
the finding that identity-preservation plays a role in the ENP would place this research 
in dialogue with perspectives on the EU’s foreign policy that understand the role of the 
EU’s policies to be different from their prima facie ends, whether within the EU itself, 
(e.g. Rayroux 2013; Mälksoo 2016), or within the ENP countries (e.g. Sasse 2008). By 
seemingly confirming the value of these approaches, this study suggests that a deeper 
analysis of the underlying purpose/roles of the ENP could further prove a useful area of 
research. Finally, with respect to policy change more broadly, the study provides 
empirical support for understanding change through a broader, organizational lens than 
existing institutionalist accounts would provide (e.g. see Fioretos 2011, 372–76), while 
still lending support to the underlying sociological institutionalist concern for the role of 
norms in understanding change (i.e. March and Olsen 1998, 951–52). This suggests that 
there is scope for exploring points of overlap within these disparate theoretical 
approaches in order to provide a more comprehensive account of policy change in 
general. In these ways, the findings contribute not only the study of the ENP, but also to 
the broader literature concerning the EU’s foreign policy and policy change. 
 
In conclusion, the study has presented a synthetic theoretical framework and analysed 
the findings that resulted from the application of that framework in order to understand 
the lack of fundamental change within the ENP. By combining organizational learning 
and ontological security, the framework presented here provided an account of the 
ENP’s development over time that explained not just how the lack of fundamental 
learning occurred, but why this was the case. It was seen that, with the ENP, the EU did 
not engage in fundamental learning because it faced ‘errors’ that would have required it 
to change itself, and chose not to do so in order to preserve the elements of its identity 
that such a change would challenge. This result contributes to the existing literature 
concerning the ENP in the ways noted above, and to the methodological and theoretical 
potential of the two underlying theories. This study then, has not only provided an 
answer to the research question with regard to the ENP, it has highlighted the role that 
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identity plays as a factor when attempting to understand a lack of fundamental learning 
with respect to the EU’s external action. In doing so, this study has contributed to the 
understanding of the normative elements of the EU’s external action, to studies of 
policy change and policy learning within the EU, to knowledge of the practical 
interaction between behavioural norms and change within DGs, and to the analytical 
potential of organizational learning and ontological security in explaining these areas, 
while providing additional opportunities to expand this research in the future. 
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